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Women and M&A
Afra Afsharipour*
Corporations, law firms, and investment banks all state that diversity matters. This
Article shows that there is a chasm between discourse and action. For the most important
decisions undertaken by companies—large merger and acquisition (M&A) transactions—a
gender gap persists. This Article provides a holistic examination of the network of lead actors
involved in M&A, revealing that women’s leadership opportunities continue to be vastly
unequal. Using hand-collected data from 700 transactions, this Article reveals that thirty
years after women began to account for almost half of all law students, gender parity in M&A
leadership lags far behind. To illustrate, over a seven-year period, women make up on average
10.5% of lead legal advisors for buyers in large M&A deals. Moreover, this Article
documents the lack of transparency on leadership data for other players in M&A. This
Article argues that understanding, documenting, and disclosing the gender gap in M&A
leadership is critical for increasing accountability and for determining the solutions that may
work to reduce such disparities.
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INTRODUCTION
Merger and acquisition (M&A) transactions are often the most significant
undertaking by a company and a recurring feature of the business world. In 2020
alone, worldwide M&A deals totaled $3.6 trillion, with 2021 dealmaking reaching
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even higher record levels.1 Large M&A deals are often transformational events for
companies, determining whether a celebrated brand survives, whether a company
expands its business to new heights, or whether a company dies. M&A deals are
watched closely by the financial press, which regularly profiles deals and
dealmakers.2 Law firms and investment banks routinely tout their M&A prowess
and expertise, seeking to grow this lucrative practice area. Given its significance,
M&A activity is an intense focus of academics with hundreds of articles and books
on M&A from scholars across disciplines.
Undertaking a large M&A deal involves many different actors—a
corporation’s board of directors, its senior management, and legal and financial
advisors.3 Each of these actors plays a significant role in the decision to move
forward on an M&A deal and is deeply involved in the decision-making and
planning for a deal. With all these central players, there is a glaring absence of
women as leaders.4 Whether as executives, as board members, as financial advisors,
or as legal advisors, women, and particularly women of color, are vastly
underrepresented.5 And women’s progress as leaders in M&A practice has been
sluggish, at best.
Despite the importance of M&A and the central role that the actors involved
in M&A play in corporate governance, the legal literature on M&A has largely
overlooked gender disparities.6 M&A casebooks do not address gender diversity

1. REFINITIV, GLOBAL MERGERS & ACQUISITIONS REVIEW (2020); The Deals of the Year,
N.Y. TIMES: DEALBOOK (Dec. 18, 2021), https://www.nytimes.com/2021/12/18/business/
dealbook/deals-of-the-year.html [ https://perma.cc/Y6XL-7QQ7 ].
2. See, e.g., Erin Griffith & Lauren Hirsch, Salesforce to Acquire Slack for $27.7 Billion,
N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 4, 2021), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/12/01/technology/salesforce-slack-deal.html
[ https://perma.cc/NPE2-VCZ5 ].
3. A myriad of other actors, such as accountants, public relations experts, integration
consultants, and the like, are also typically involved.
4. While this Article focuses on the lack of sex diversity in M&A, there is also a glaring lack of
racial diversity in the boardroom, C-Suite, and among leading advisors in M&A. Some scholars have
long urged strategies to address racial justice using the tools of corporate governance. See, e.g., Thomas
W. Joo, Corporate Hierarchy and Racial Justice, 79 ST. JOHN’S L. REV. 955, 968–74 (2005). Nonetheless,
as the racial reckoning of 2020 highlighted, again, there are few Black directors or executives in
leadership roles at the largest companies in the United States. See David Gelles, Corporate America Has
Failed Black America, N.Y. TIMES (June 6, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/06/06/business/
corporate-america-has-failed-black-america.html [ https://perma.cc/6SB3-495M]. To begin to address
this problem, there is a critical need for greater disclosure of racial and gender metrics at companies
and their myriad of advisors. See generally Veronica Root Martinez & Gina-Gail S. Fletcher, Equality
Metrics, 130 YALE L.J. F. 869 (2021). Furthermore, I hope to explore the lack of racial diversity in M&A
more fully in future scholarly work.
5. It is not surprising that women of color are underrepresented as M&A advisors. The 2020
National Association for Law Placement Report on Diversity in U.S. Law Firms found that only ten
percent of all partners at law firms are people of color, and less than four percent of partners are women
of color. NAT’L ASS’N FOR L. PLACEMENT, 2020 REPORT ON DIVERSITY IN U.S. LAW FIRMS 25,
chart 7 (2021).
6. For an excellent examination of how gender politics have shaped the foundations of
corporate law and corporate governance, see Sarah C. Haan, Corporate
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issues; few law review articles focus on gender disparities in M&A;7 the celebrated
M&A cases rarely feature women executives, board members, or lawyers; and elite
M&A legal practice remains dominated by men.8
This Article addresses the gap in the literature. Corporations, law firms, and
investment banks all state that diversity matters. This Article provides a holistic
analysis of the lead actors involved in M&A transactions, revealing gender
disparities in leadership among each of these actors. After decades of
pronouncements about the commitment to diversity, there remains a significant
underrepresentation of women in leadership among all the institutions involved in
M&A. This Article contends that gender diversity matters for both equity reasons
and to improve M&A decision-making. Yet, organizations aiming to achieve greater
diversity in M&A leadership face a difficult task that requires tackling persistent and
pervasive inequalities from many angles. This Article argues that understanding,
documenting, and disclosing the gender disparity in leadership in M&A is critical
for increasing accountability and for determining the solutions that may work to
reduce gender disparities in the leading institutions involved in M&A practice.9 The
Article contributes to those efforts by enhancing the focus on diversity in the M&A
literature through a robust, quantitative study.
Much of the literature on women’s participation in corporate governance has
focused on the board of directors. Numerous articles and books have examined
board diversity.10 But while boards are important players in M&A deals, boards do
Governance and the Feminization of Capital, 74 S TAN . L. R EV . (forthcoming 2022), https://
papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3740608 [ https://perma.cc/PHV7-GGAR ].
7. Recent scholarship has addressed how feminist movements, such as the #MeToo movement,
have impacted M&A dealmaking. See generally Anna Windemuth, The #MeToo Movement Migrates to
M&A Boilerplate, 129 YALE L. J. 488 (2019); see also Amelia Miazad, Sex, Power, and Corporate
Governance, 54 UC DAVIS L. REV. 1913, 1980–81 (2021).
8. Even in corporate law cases that involve women or women’s interests, considerations of
gender are ignored. See Afra Afsharipour, Commentary on Revlon, Inc. v. MacAndrews & Forbes
Holdings, Inc., in FEMINIST JUDGMENTS IN CORPORATE LAW (Anne Choike, Usha
Rodrigues & Kelli Alces Williams eds., forthcoming 2022); Ann Lipton, Capital Discrimination,
__ HOUS. L. REV. (forthcoming 2022) (manuscript at 26–28) (on file with author).
9. As Professor Jamillah Bowman Williams has argued, “[ w ]ithout information and data on
workplace representation, pay equity, and best practices for promoting inclusion, it is difficult to know
what problems exist and how to create effective strategies moving forward.” Jamillah Bowman
Williams, Diversity as a Trade Secret, 107 GEO. L.J. 1685, 1724 (2019).
10. See, e.g., AARON A. DHIR, CHALLENGING BOARDROOM HOMOGENEITY: CORPORATE
LAW, GOVERNANCE, AND DIVERSITY (2016); Lisa M. Fairfax, Fall 2018 Symposium: All on Board?
Board Diversity Trends Reflect Signs of Promise and Concern, 87 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1031, 1032 (2019)
[ hereinafter Fairfax, All on Board?]; Darren Rosenblum, California Dreaming? 99 B.U. L. REV. 1435,
1437 (2019) [ hereinafter Rosenblum, California Dreaming?]; Darren Rosenblum, When Does Sex
Diversity on Boards Benefit Firms?, 20 U. PA. J. BUS. L. 429, 431–32 (2017) [ hereinafter Rosenblum,
When Does Sex Diversity on Boards Benefit Firms?]; Yaron Nili, Beyond the Numbers: Substantive Gender
Diversity in Boardrooms, 94 IND. L.J. 145, 147–48 (2019); Darren Rosenblum & Daria Roithmayr, More
than a Woman: Insights into Corporate Governance After the French Sex Quota, 48 IND. L. REV. 889,
889–90 (2015); Joan MacLeod Heminway, Women in the Crowd of Corporate Directors: Following,
Walking Alone, and Meaningfully Contributing, 21 WM. & MARY J. WOMEN & L. 59, 60–61 (2014);
Deborah L. Rhode & Amanda K. Packel, Diversity on Corporate Boards: How Much Difference Does
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not act in a vacuum and frequently play an acquiescent role in M&A.11 For most
large M&A deals, board decisions only arise after significant involvement by a
company’s management.12 Management largely controls the flow of information to
the board.13 C-Suite executives determine whether an M&A transaction is initiated
and how it is valued, negotiated, and completed. In other words, when it comes to
M&A, senior executives run the show and are often the proponents of
these transactions.
The C-Suite’s gender disparities are well-documented. Few women lead
companies in corporate America, and even fewer women of color are represented
in the C-Suite.14 By late 2020, the number of women chief executive officers
(CEOs) of Fortune 500 companies hit an unprecedented high of forty-one, about
eight percent, although women still make up less than a quarter of C-level
executives.15 The absence of women of color in the C-Suite is particularly notable.
Women of color account for about twenty percent of the U.S. population and make
up almost eighteen percent of entry level workers at firms.16 Yet in 2020, few
women of color held leadership positions at large corporations, with only three
percent holding C-Suite positions.17 Not only are women underrepresented as

Difference Make?, 38 DEL. J. CORP. L. 377, 378 (2014); Lisa M. Fairfax, Board Diversity Revisited: New
Rationale, Same Old Story?, 89 N.C. L. REV. 855, 859 (2011) [ hereinafter Fairfax, Board Diversity
Revisited]; Lisa M. Fairfax, Clogs in the Pipeline: The Mixed Data on Women Directors and Continued
Barriers to Their Advancement, 65 MD. L. REV. 579, 580 (2006); Lisa M. Fairfax, The Bottom Line on
Board Diversity: A Cost-Benefit Analysis of the Business Rationales for Diversity on Corporate Boards,
2005 WIS. L. REV. 795, 797.
11. See Afra Afsharipour, Bias, Identity and M&A, 2020 WISC. L. REV. 471, 474–75.
12. See Afra Afsharipour & J. Travis Laster, Enhanced Scrutiny on the Buy-Side,
53 GA. L. REV. 443, 480–81 (2019); Leo E. Strine, Jr., Documenting the Deal: How Quality Control and
Candor Can Improve Boardroom Decision-making and Reduce the Litigation Target Zone,
70 BUS. LAW. 679, 683 (2015).
13. See Nicola F. Sharpe, The Cosmetic Independence of Corporate Boards, 34
SEATTLE U. L. REV. 1435, 1453–55 (2011).
14. See infra Section I.A. Over the past decade, women have made up more than one-third of
MBA graduates, rising to close to forty percent at leading business schools. Kathryn Dill, More Women
Pursue M.B.A. as Elite Schools Step Up Recruiting, WALL ST. J. (Nov. 6, 2019, 5:30 AM),
https://www.wsj.com/articles/more-women-pursue-m-b-a-as-elite-schools-step-up-recruiting-11573036204
[ https://perma.cc/5HP7-F9CJ ].
15. See Vanessa Fuhrmans, There Are More Female CEOs Than Ever, and Many of Them Are
in Retail, WALL ST. J. (Nov. 25, 2020, 1:17 PM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/there-are-morefemale-ceos-than-ever-and-many-of-them-are-in-retail-11606328235 [ https://perma.cc/S2Z9-LVE5 ].
The numbers in 2020 were a significant increase from just two years prior, when the number of women
CEOs in the Fortune 500, small to begin with, fell by twenty-five percent. See Claire Cain Miller, The
Number of Female Chief Executives Is Falling, N.Y. TIMES: THEUPSHOT (May 23, 2018),
https://www.nytimes.com/2018/05/23/upshot/why-the-number-of-female-chief-executives-is-falling.html
[ https://perma.cc/JT6G-4F5H ].
16. Women of Color in the United States (Quick Take), CATALYST (Feb. 1, 2021),
https://www.catalyst.org/research/women-of-color-in-the-united-states/
[ https://perma.cc/
YNB5-GHE7 ].
17. RACHEL THOMAS, MARIANNE COOPER, GINA CARDAZONE, KATE URBAN,
ALI BOHRER, LAREINA YEE, ALEXIS KRIVKOVICH, JESS HUANG, SARA PRINCE,
ANKUR KUMAR & SARAH COURY, WOMEN IN THE WORKPLACE 2020, at 8 (2020),
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CEOs, but few leaders in the corporate development teams responsible for
executing M&A transactions are women.18 In short, “corporations have been faster
to embrace diverse directors (who monitor management at a distance)” than
diverse executives.19
Women also continue to be underrepresented on boards, although due to the
focus on gender diversity on the board, the numbers here are less skewed than in
the C-Suite. In 2018, approximately twenty-three percent of board members of
Fortune 500 board seats were held by women.20 By 2020, that number had moved
up to twenty-eight percent, with the recruitment of women board members gaining
steam.21 Nevertheless, progress on racial diversity on boards has lagged. Few board
seats are filled by women of color, with women of color making up only ten percent
of new board appointments in 2020.22 Data shows that in 2018, Black/African
American, Asian/Pacific Islander, and Latinx women together held less than five
percent of board seats in the Fortune 500, a small uptick from 2010 when fewer
than three percent of board seats were held by minority women.23
In M&A deals, senior executives and boards rarely act on their own, and many
deal teams are populated by highly compensated financial and legal advisors.
Advisors play a key role in the valuation, negotiation, and completion of deals, as
well as in the diligence and complex documentation process involved in M&A
transactions.24 Among advisors, there has been little transparency or data on
women’s involvement in M&A, although anecdotal reports suggest that as among
corporate executives, there is a significant lack of women as M&A advisors.25 This
https://wiw-report.s3.amazonaws.com/Women_in_the_Workplace_2020.pdf
[ https://perma.cc/
TKF2-ULBC]. As of February 2021, only three Fortune 500 companies were led by women of color.
See Alisha Ebrahimji, Female Fortune 500 CEOs Reach an All-time High, but It’s Still a Small Percentage,
CNN BUS. (May 20, 2020, 10:46 AM ET), https://www.cnn.com/2020/05/20/us/fortune-500women-ceos-trnd/index.html [ https://perma.cc/DW3W-BZTY ].
18. See Janet Burns, The Results Are in: Women Are Great for Business, but Still Getting Pushed
out, FORBES (Sept. 22, 2017, 1:41PM) https://www.forbes.com/sites/janetwburns/2017/09/22/2016proved-women-are-great-for-business-yet-still-being-pushed-out/?sh=21c8e8c9188b
[ https://
perma.cc/S8LT-L8KS].
19. Susan E. Reed, Corporate Boards Are Diversifying. The C-suite Isn’t., WASH. POST ( Jan. 4,
2019), https://www.washingtonpost.com/outlook/corporate-boards-are-diversifying-the-c-suite-isnt/
2019/01/04/c45c3328-0f02-11e9-8938-5898adc28fa2_story.html [ https://perma.cc/9ZZ7-ZCSM ].
20. DELOITTE & ALLIANCE FOR BOARD DIVERSITY, MISSING PIECES REPORT: THE 2018
BOARD DIVERSITY CENSUS OF WOMEN AND MINORITIES ON F ORTUNE 500 BOARDS 9 fig. 7 (2019),
https://www2.deloitte.com/content/dam/Deloitte/us/Documents/center-for-board-effectiveness/
us-cbe-missing-pieces-report-2018-board-diversity-census.pdf [ https://perma.cc/7B5S-B7F7 ].
21. SPENCER STUART, 2020 U.S. SPENCER STUART BOARD INDEX HIGHLIGHTS 3 (2020).
22. Id. at 6. DELOITTE & ALLIANCE FOR BOARD DIVERSITY, supra note 20, at 6, 31–34.
23. DELOITTE & ALLIANCE FOR BOARD DIVERSITY, supra note 20, at 17–18.
24. For more on complexity in M&A, see Cathy Hwang, Unbundled Bargains: Multi-Agreement
Dealmaking in Complex Mergers and Acquisitions, 164 U. PA. L. REV. 1403 (2016).
25. Diane Frankle, Jennifer Muller & Eric Talley, Fixing the Dearth of Women in M&A, DAILY
J. (Sept. 22, 2014), https://www.law.berkeley.edu/files/bclbe/Women_in_M_and_A%281%29.pdf
[ https://perma.cc/2UWE-57NV ]; Simon Mortlock, J.P. Morgan M&A Head: Female Bankers Must
Network Better, Be More Mobile, and Have “Initiative” to Reach the Top, EFINANCIALCAREERS
(May 30, 2018), https://www.efinancialcareers.com/news/2018/05/ee-ching-tay-jpmorgan [ https://
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trend is especially prevalent in leadership and management roles in both the legal
and investment banking industries.26
Focusing on one set of the advisors—legal advisors—this Article presents
hand-collected data from the largest 100 public company transactions in each year
from 2014 to 2020. Women have accounted for almost half of all law students for
almost thirty years, and one would expect some progress toward gender parity in
leadership roles in M&A practice.27 The study in this Article, however, reveals a
persistent gender gap in lead legal advisors in M&A transactions. Rather than being
leaders on deals, women are “often in secondary roles in practice areas supporting
the deal, reflecting the wide gender disparity in the most senior levels of M&A.”28
For example, Davis Polk, one of the leading law firms in the United States and the
leading firm for worldwide M&A in 2020, has received awards for its “commitment
to integrating women into leadership positions.”29 The study in this Article finds,
however, that until 2020, not a single woman served as lead corporate attorney on
the dozens of large M&A matters led by Davis Polk during the period covered by
this study.30
The data on financial advisors is more opaque than it is for legal advisors.
There is little industry, firm, or deal-specific disclosure on women’s leadership in

perma.cc/S336-T6KU ]. The gender gap in law firms generally is well-documented. See, e.g., ROBERTA
D. LIEBENBERG & STEPHANIE A. SCHARF, WALKING OUT THE DOOR: THE FACTS, FIGURES, AND
FUTURE OF EXPERIENCED WOMEN LAWYERS IN PRIVATE PRACTICE (2019),
https://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/administrative/women/walkoutdoor_online_0423
20.pdf [ https://perma.cc/QFR9-2S48 ]; Ghazala Azmat & Rosa Ferrer, Gender Gaps in
Performance: Evidence from Young Lawyers, 125 J. POL. ECON. 1306 (2017).
26. See Lizzy McLellan, M&A’s Missing Women, LAW.COM (Mar. 27, 2017, 12:08
AM), https://www.law.com/sites/almstaff/2017/03/27/mas-missing-women/ [ https://perma.cc/
8YMV-ZG98 ].
27. See generally Legal Education & Admissions to the Bar, Statistics, AM. BAR ASS’N,
https://www.americanbar.org/groups/legal_education/resources/statistics/
[ https://perma.cc/
Y2P3-LGLH].
28. Patrick Smith, When It Comes to Leading Big M&A Deals, Women are an Illusion,
LAW.COM: THE AM. LAW., (Jan. 13, 2021, 10:00 AM), https://www.law.com/americanlawyer/
2021/01/13/when-it-comes-to-leading-big-ma-deals-women-are-an-illusion/ [ https://perma.cc/
A7RB-HT4P][ .
29. Press Release, Davis Polk, Davis Polk Named a 2020 “Gold Standard Firm” by Women in
Law Empowerment Forum (Feb. 17, 2021), https://www.davispolk.com/news/davis-polk-named2020-gold-standard-firm-women-law-empowerment-forum-0 [ https://perma.cc/RLS5-7RUK]. See
Roy Strom, Here’s the Secret to Davis Polk’s Banner 2020—and 2021 So Far, BLOOMBERG
L. (Apr. 22, 2021, 1:55AM), https://news.bloomberglaw.com/business-and-practice/heres-the-secretto-davis-polks-banner-2020-and-2021-so-far [ https://perma.cc/9DV9-57TY ].
30. According to Davis Polk’s website, as of September 2021, women account for four out of
forty-seven partners identified as having M&A expertise. Lawyers, DAVIS POLK, https://bit.ly/3l8iIXa
[ https://perma.cc/3VWY-BZBZ] (last visited Nov. 14, 2021 ). Wachtell Lipton, the law firm with the
most lead counsel roles in the deals included in this Article’s study, lists thirty-nine corporate partners
out of which four are women. See Attorneys, WACHTELL, LIPTON, ROSEN & KATZ,
https://bit.ly/3D8EVdz [ https://perma.cc/3AYY-F549 ] ( last visited Nov. 14, 2021 ).

Clean Final Edit_Afsharipour_v2 (ET editrs).docx (Do Not Delete)

366

UC IRVINE LAW REVIEW

1/31/2022 10:48 AM

[ V ol. 12:359

M&A investment banking. Nevertheless, the limited information available and press
reports highlight the male-dominated banking and finance industry.31
Not only are women underrepresented as legal and financial advisors in M&A
transactions, but even the training of women as future lawyers and bankers indicates
underrepresentation. This Article’s survey of M&A courses taught in 2018–2019
and 2019–2020 at top-fifty-ranked law schools in the United States shows that
fewer than fifteen percent of faculty teaching M&A-related courses are women,
with women adjunct faculty making up approximately ten percent of all adjunct
faculty in such courses.32 The enrollment of students in M&A courses also reflect
gender disparities. An ABA survey of students at leading law schools found that
enrollment of women in M&A-related courses was thirty-seven percent, despite
women making up more than half of all law students.33
Why do the gender disparities in M&A matter? The paucity of women as
decision makers in M&A transactions is alarming for several reasons.34 First, from
an equity standpoint, a significant portion of the population does not hold key
decision-making roles in fundamental deals that greatly impact companies and
billions of dollars trading hands.35 Second, research on group decision-making
suggests that greater diversity could improve M&A transactions significantly. M&A
transactions are often the most impactful decisions that a corporation can
undertake.36 Research suggests, however, that M&A deals are also plagued with

31. See Naomi Cahn, June Carbone & Nancy Levit, Gender and the Tournament: Reinventing
Antidiscrimination Law in an Age of Inequality, 96 TEX. L. REV. 425, 456 (2018)[ ; see also Mortlock,
supra note 25; Megan Davies & Paritosh Bansal, M&A Still Overwhelmingly a Man’s Game, REUTERS
(Apr. 12, 2011, 10:41AM), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-mergers-summit-women/ma-stilloverwhelmingly-a-mans-game-idUSTRE73A7NT20110412 [ https://perma.cc/8CB7-LU3M]; Shama
Hyder, Why Investing in Women Investment Bankers Pays Off, FORBES ( July 8, 2014, 9:00AM),
https://www.forbes.com/sites/yec/2014/07/08/why-investing-in-women-investment-bankers-paysoff/#1b480f9ff0b9 [ https://perma.cc/X6A7-EVQ2 ]. As recounted in Claire Hill and Richard
Painter’s book, “a distorted vision of masculinity in banking” where excessive risk taking is seen as a
“sign” of masculinity has contributed to problematic practices in the banking profession generally.
CLAIRE A. HILL & RICHARD W. PAINTER, BETTER BANKERS, BETTER BANKS 10, 99 (2015).
32. For an investigation into the intersection of gender and race in legal academia, see MEERA
E. DEO, UNEQUAL PROFESSION: RACE AND GENDER IN LEGAL ACADEMIA (2019).
33. Frankle et al., supra note 25.
34. While other forms of diversity are likely also relevant to M&A decision-making, the
overwhelming majority of empirical and psychological diversity literature focuses exclusively on the
effects of women in the boardroom. For a survey of extant literature addressing various facets of
demographic diversity, see generally Muneza Kagzi & Mahua Guha, Board Demographic Diversity: A
Review of Literature, 11 J. STRATEGY & MGMT. 33 (2018).
35. Lisa Fairfax, for example, has emphasized the importance of acknowledging social and
moral justifications for board diversity. Fairfax, Board Diversity Revisited, supra note 10, at 859.
36. See Ken Smith, The M&A Buck Stops at the Board: Directors Are Learning Fast How to
Screen out No-Win Deals, MERGERS & ACQUISITIONS: DEALMAKER’S J., Apr. 1, 2006, at 48, 49; see also
Andrew Balls, Big Firms Lose Value in Acquisitions, NBER DIGEST, Aug. 2003, at 3;
Scott A. Christofferson, Robert S. McNish & Diane L. Sias, Where Mergers Go Wrong, MCKINSEY
Q. (May 1, 2004), https://www.mckinsey.com/business-functions/strategy-and-corporate-finance/
our-insights/where-mergers-go-wrong [ https://perma.cc/3W4K-QNM4 ].
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shortcomings in decision-making.37 As this Article discusses, a new body of finance
literature has begun to explore the connection between M&A transactions and lack
of diversity in M&A, suggesting that greater diversity may improve M&A outcomes.
This Article seeks to enhance the focus on diversity in the M&A literature.
Part I provides a textured examination of the roles of executives and the
contemporary board of directors, chronicling the paucity of women as leaders in
the C-Suite and the boardroom. Part II focuses on the advisors typically involved
in M&A transactions. Academic studies have to date ignored the lack of women
advisors in M&A. This Article is the first academic article to examine the lack of
women as M&A advisors with a focus on legal advisors. Using hand-collected data
from the top 100 public company transactions in each year from 2014 to 2020, this
Article’s study uncovers the persistent gender gap among legal advisors in
M&A transactions.
Part III addresses the implications of empirical findings regarding the gender
gap among executives, directors, and advisors in M&A transactions. Part III argues
that the lack of gender diversity in M&A is important from an equity and access
perspective. Part III also examines the literature on the effects of diversity for group
culture and decision-making and ties this literature to existing literature that suggests
that M&A deals and dealmakers are particularly susceptible to agency problems and
behavioral biases. Reducing gender disparities in M&A more broadly will present
significantly greater challenges than achieving board diversity. Part IV addresses the
policy implications of this Article’s findings and examines various tools that may be
useful for advancing diversity in leadership ranks in M&A.
I. THE DEARTH OF WOMEN IN M&A: BOARDS AND THE C-SUITE
M&A transactions are primarily driven by senior executives, directors,
financial advisors, and legal advisors. Each of these players has a central role in the
decision-making for a transaction. This Section examines the roles of executives and
the contemporary board of directors in M&A transactions and chronicles the
underrepresentation of women in both the C-Suite and the boardroom.
A. Women as Executives in Corporate America
While corporate law and scholarship largely focus on the board and the
interplay between the board and shareholders, for today’s large public companies,
senior executives—especially CEOs—dominate decision-making.38 CEOs “wield

37. See generally Afsharipour & Laster, supra note 12, at 453–54 (surveying literature on agency
costs in M&A); Afra Afsharipour, Reevaluating Shareholder Voting Rights in M&A Transactions,
70 OKLA. L. REV. 127, 133–35 (2017).
38. See, e.g., Megan Wischmeier Shaner, Officer Accountability, 32 GA. ST. U. L. REV. 357, 367
(2016) (describing an “officer-dominated model of corporate governance, with officers exerting
immense power and influence over the corporation”); Usha Rodrigues, From Loyalty to
Conflict: Addressing Fiduciary Duty at the Officer Level, 61 FLA. L. REV. 1, 1 (2009) (describing officers
as the “true corporate decision makers”).
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tremendous power and influence in running corporate America[,]” and “decisions
made by these individuals can result in the success or collapse of their
companies—and in some cases may even impact the broader economy.”39
The domination of C-level executives in corporate decision-making and in
allocating the resources of a company is particularly acute in M&A deals where
executives are really the first among equals. Senior managers run the show and are
often the proponents of M&A transactions. They typically control the initial
conversations about a potential deal, and if deal negotiations move forward, senior
managers control much of the flow of information to the board.40 A CEO plays a
multifaceted role in M&A deals: a visionary who frames “the strategic vision for the
[deal]”; a cheerleader who must “generate enthusiasm” for the deal and “confront
fear and uncertainty” about the success of the deal; a deal closer; a captain who
manages the integration of the two companies; and a crusader for the merged
entity.41 Not only do CEOs dominate M&A decision-making but they also play an
outsize societal role. The Economist magazine described CEOs as the “new
aristocrats of power.”42 Like the aristocrats of old, most CEOs are “white
and male.”43
Large companies have long touted their commitment to diversity.44 Yet few
of the C-Suite leaders of corporate America are women, and even fewer are women
of color.45 Studies find that women are less likely to become CEOs, even when they
did not differ from men on interpersonal, analytical, and managerial skills and
general ability.46 By early 2020, less than six percent of CEOs of Fortune 500
39. Shaner, supra note 38, at 357–59.
40. See Orit Gadiesh, Robin Buchanan, Mark Daniell & Charles Ormiston, A CEO’s Guide to
the New Challenges of M&A Leadership, 30 STRATEGY & LEADERSHIP, no. 3, 2002, at 13, 13–14.
41. Id.
42. The New Aristocrats of Power, ECONOMIST, Feb. 23, 2019, at 71.
43. Meet the New Boss: What it Takes to Be a CEO in the 2020s, ECONOMIST, Feb. 6, 2020,
at 9.
44. Patrick S. Shin & Mitu Gulati, Showcasing Diversity, 89 N.C. L. REV. 1017, 1017–18 (2011).
45. See DEBORAH L. RHODE, WOMEN AND LEADERSHIP 56–57 (2017). In general, few people
of color hold leadership positions at large companies. See Chris Brummer & Leo E. Strine, Jr., Duty and
Diversity, 75 VAND. L. REV. 1 (forthcoming 2022) (manuscript at 14–18), https://
papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3788159 [ https://perma.cc/Z66A-E5TB ]. A 2020
study found that non-white executives held only nine percent of CEO roles among Fortune 500
companies. David F. Larcker & Brian Tayan, Diversity in the C-Suite: The Dismal State of Diversity
Among Fortune 100 Senior Executives 1, 7 (Rock Ctr. for Corp. Governance, Stan. Closer Look
Series – CGRP82, 2020), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3587498
[ https://perma.cc/53CC-9DE6 ]. The one role with a significant growth in the C-Suite is that of the
chief diversity officer (CDO), with many companies appointing CDOs in 2020. See Mita Mallick, Do
You Know Why Your Company Needs a Chief Diversity Officer, HARV. BUS. REV. (Sept. 11, 2020),
https://hbr.org/2020/09/do-you-know-why-your-company-needs-a-chief-diversity-officer
[ https://perma.cc/Z4MP-HVRV ]. Reports indicate, however, that the CDO role is “marked by high
turnover” with many CDOs feeling disillusioned by “a lack of resources, unrealistic expectations and
inadequate support from senior executives.” Chip Cutter & Lauren Weber, Demand for Chief Diversity
Officers Is High. So Is Turnover., WALL ST. J. ( July 13, 2020, 7:00 AM).
46. Miller, supra note 15; see Steven Neil Kaplan & Morten Sorensen, Are CEOs Different? 76
J. FIN. 1773, 1805 (2021).
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companies were women, and women made up about a quarter of C-level
executives.47 In May 2020, CNN reported thirty-seven women were CEOs of
Fortune 500 companies, hitting an all-time record.48 While this was a significant
achievement for gender diversity, only three women CEOs in 2020 were women of
color.49 Looking at a broader array of companies, as of 2018, only nine percent of
top executive roles in the Russell 3000 were held by women.50
Women are often underrepresented in decision-making centers of
corporations responsible for M&A deals. Few of the executives that are responsible
for executing M&A transactions, that is, the corporate development teams of
companies, are women.51 And in 2018, half of Fortune 50 companies had no women
of color on leadership teams.52
Studies indicate that meaningful progress to diverse corporate leadership has
been slow “even as public pressure to move from the status quo has continued to
grow (most notably through the global #MeToo movement against sexual
harassment and assault) from institutional investors, regulators, and lawmakers.”53
A 2018 study by McKinsey & Company and LeanIn.Org noted that although firms
claim a high commitment to gender diversity, this “has not translated into
meaningful progress. The proportion of women at every level in corporate America
has hardly changed. Progress isn’t just slow. It’s stalled.”54 A 2019 study by the same
47. Pyramid: Women in S&P 500 Companies (Infographic), CATALYST (Jan. 15, 2020),
http://www.saichefulicai01.com/index-272.html [ https://perma.cc/DD7L-6K97 ]; Vanessa Fuhrmans,
Where Are All the Women CEOs?, WALL ST. J. (Feb. 6, 2020, 10:34 AM), https://www.wsj.com/
articles/why-so-few-ceos-are-women-you-can-have-a-seat-at-the-table-and-not-be-a-player-11581003276
[ https://perma.cc/ZBV3-8QU8 ][ ; Miller, supra note 15; DAVID A. BELL & DAWN BELT, FENWICK
& WEST, GENDER DIVERSITY IN SILICON VALLEY 52 (2018). See generally AMANDA KIMBALL, UC
DAVIS GRADUATE SCH. OF MGMT., UC DAVIS STUDY OF CALIFORNIA WOMEN BUSINESS
LEADERS: A CENSUS OF WOMEN DIRECTORS AND HIGHEST-PAID EXECUTIVES 2015–2016 (2015),
https://www.usu.edu/uwlp/files/ucdaviswomenstudy2015_web.pdf [ https://perma.cc/4CB7-VZ6G ].
48. Ebrahimji, supra note 17; Emma Hinchliffe, The Number of Female CEOs in the Fortune
500 Hits an All-time Record, FORTUNE (May 18, 2020, 4:15 AM), https://fortune.com/2020/05/18/
women-ceos-fortune-500-2020/ [ https://perma.cc/39V7-7LQN ].
49. Ebrahimji, supra note 17. Black people are particularly underrepresented as executives
among large companies in the United States, holding only one percent of CEO positions in the S&P
500 companies, even though they constitute approximately thirteen percent of the population in the
United States. See Te-Ping Chen, Why Are There Still So Few Black CEOs?, WALL ST. J. (Sept. 28,
2020, 10:16 AM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/why-are-there-still-so-few-black-ceos-11601302601
[ https://perma.cc/RL6N-R2JJ ].
50. Subodh Mishra, Women in the C-Suite: The Next Frontier in Gender Diversity,
HARV. L. SCH. F. ON CORP. GOVERNANCE (Aug. 13, 2018), https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2018/
08/13/women-in-the-c-suite-the-next-frontier-in-gender-diversity/ [ https://perma.cc/BR36-2QA8 ].
51. See FENWICK & WEST, supra note 47, at 61.
52. Georgene Huang, Women of Color Left Behind as Women Are Added to Boards, Management,
FORBES (Nov. 27, 2018, 8:53 AM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/georgenehuang/2018/11/
27/women-of-color-left-behind-as-women-are-added-to-boards-management/?sh=2941eb9b5d9c
[ https://perma.cc/UG2R-QZAT].
53. FENWICK & WEST, supra note 47, at 1.
54. RACHEL THOMAS, MARIANNE COOPER, ELLEN KONAR, MEGAN ROONEY, MARY
NOBLE-TOLLA, ALI BOHRER, LAREINA YEE, ALEXIS KRIVKOVICH, IRINA STARIKOVA, KELSEY
ROBINSON, MARIE-CLAUDE NADEAU & NICOLE ROBINSON, WOMEN IN THE WORKPLACE 2018,
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organizations found that companies are slowly adding more women to the C-Suite,
although the overall representation is “far from parity” given that only one in five
C-Suite executives is a woman and only one in twenty-five C-Suite executives is a
woman of color.55 Furthermore, a 2020 study conducted by the Wall Street Journal
shows that men overwhelmingly get the management positions, such as those that
include profit-and-loss (P&L) responsibilities, that set executives on the
CEO track.56
Women of color, in particular, face disproportionate barriers to advancing to
the C-Suite.57 While women of color make up around twenty percent of the
U.S. population and about eighteen percent of entry-level positions in firms, they
hold few leadership positions in companies.58 For example, in 2020, few women of
color advanced to leadership positions, with only three percent of C-Suite positions
held by women of color.59 Another study found that among the Fortune 100,
Asian/Pacific Islander women had the most representation among women of color
in any C-Suite positions as seven out of 349 P&L leaders.60 The second most
representation of women of color in C-Suite positions is a tie between three Black
women as P&L leaders and another three Black women as general counsel.61
Research indicates that women of color have a double hurdle derived from
their race and gender identities that impedes their ascent to the upper ranks of
corporate America.62 In many elite professions, women of color are devalued by
“the compound effects often caused by holding multiple devalued identity
at 4 (2018), https://wiw-report.s3.amazonaws.com/Women_in_the_Workplace_2018.pdf [ https://
perma.cc/D9NL-T7FE ].
55. RACHEL THOMAS, MARIANNE COOPER, ELLEN KONAR, MEGAN ROONEY, MARY
NOBLE-TOLLA, ALI BOHRER, LAREINA YEE, ALEXIS KRIVKOVICH, IRINA STARIKOVA, KELSEY
ROBINSON, MARIE-CLAUDE NADEAU & NICOLE ROBINSON, WOMEN IN THE WORKPLACE 2019,
at
9
(2019),
https://wiw-report.s3.amazonaws.com/Women_in_the_Workplace_2019.pdf
[ https://perma.cc/M897-Y9UJ ].
56. Fuhrmans, supra note 47.
57. WOMEN IN THE WORKPLACE 2019, supra note 55, at 28–31. People of color are generally
underrepresented in C-Suite positions. A 2020 study by Larcker and Tayan of the Fortune 100 found
that “racially diverse executives hold only 16 percent of total C-Suite positions” and that twenty-six
companies in the Fortune 100 had zero racially diverse executives in the C-Suite. Larcker & Tayan, supra
note 45, at 2.
58. See Larcker & Tayan, supra note 45, at 17–23.
59. WOMEN IN THE WORKPLACE 2020, supra note 17, at 8; Women of Color in the United States,
supra note 16.
60. Larcker & Tayan, supra note 45, at 18.
61. Id. at 20.
62. See Cheryl L. Wade, Transforming Discriminatory Corporate Cultures: This Is Not Just
Women’s Work, 65 MD. L. REV. 346, 350–54 (2006); Lisa M. Fairfax, Some Reflections on the Diversity
of Corporate Boards: Women, People of Color, and the Unique Issues Associated with Women of Color, 79
ST. JOHN’S L. REV. 1105, 1105 (2006); Nina Bahadur, How C-Suite Women of Color Have Powerfully
Redefined Executive Presence, WORKING MOTHER (May 13, 2020), https://www.workingmother.com/
new-executive-presence [ https://perma.cc/EV8U-EMD2 ]; Ruchika Tulshyan, Speaking Up as a
Woman of Color at Work, FORBES (Feb. 10, 2015, 12:38 PM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/
ruchikatulshyan/2015/02/10/speaking-up-as-a-woman-of-color-at-work/#15305d772ea3 [ https://
perma.cc/5ZG5-5X4T ].

Clean Final Edit_Afsharipour_v2 (ET editrs).docx (Do Not Delete)

2022 ]

WOMEN AND M&A

1/31/2022 10:48 AM

371

characteristics, namely the intersection of race and gender.”63 The 2017 Women in
the Workplace report observed that companies often “overlook the realities of
women of color, who face the greatest obstacles and receive the least support.”64
One explanation is that companies “prioritize” gender diversity more than racial
diversity.65 The danger of not equally prioritizing both is the risk of overlooking
complex and varied experiences women undergo, particularly those of
women of color.
The 2019 Women in the Workplace report maintained that the greatest obstacle
to women, including women of color, is the “broken rung.”66 The broken rung
refers to the lack of support for a woman’s initial promotion to a manager position,
that could theoretically kickstart a woman’s promotion.67 Thus, while white women
may come up against a “glass ceiling,” women of color hit a “concrete ceiling” since
they are usually supported less and receive fewer opportunities or projects that
would help accelerate a promotion.68 Black women in particular are more likely to
report they never have senior-level contact.69
The COVID-19 pandemic may further hamper women’s climb to the C-Suite.
Studies show that the challenges wrought by the pandemic have disproportionately
affected women and that many women, especially mothers and caregivers in
leadership positions, are considering “downshifting” their careers or exiting the
workforce.70 And the pandemic has disproportionately harmed Black and Latinx
women, who are already underrepresented in senior leadership positions.71 There is
significant concern that the loss of women as leaders in the workforce may have
negative downstream effects on diversity at all levels of the workforce.72
B. Women on Boards
Corporate law places the board at the center of decision-making for M&A
transactions. Under state corporate law, the board is charged with managing the
63. DEO, supra note 32, at 8.
64. RACHEL THOMAS, MARIANNE COOPER, ELLEN KONAR, MEGAN ROONEY, ASHLEY
FINCH, LAREINA YEE, ALEXIS KRIVKOVICH, IRINA STARIKOVA, KELSEY ROBINSON & RACHEL
VALENTINO, WOMEN IN THE WORKPLACE 2017, at 2 (2017), https://wiw-report.s3.amazonaws.com/
Women_in_the_Workplace_2017_print.pdf [ https://perma.cc/KK9U-BB3H ].
65. Id. at 23.
66. WOMEN IN THE WORKPLACE 2019, supra note 55, at 5, 8.
67. Id. at 11.
68. Julia Carpenter, Forget the ‘Glass Ceiling.’ Women Of Color Face A ‘Concrete Ceiling’, CNN
MONEY (Aug. 8, 2018, 7:05 AM), https://money.cnn.com/2018/08/06/pf/women-of-color-ceos/
index.html [ https://perma.cc/5VVY-3RBS ]; see also WOMEN IN THE WORKPLACE 2019, supra note
55, at 8, 11, 28; Fuhrmans, supra note 47.
69. See WOMEN IN THE WORKPLACE 2020, supra note 17, at 28.
70. Id. at 6.
71. Id. at 28–29.
72. Id. at 25. Studies find that gender diverse leadership teams are associated with stronger
equity practices at firms. See generally Christy Glass & Alison Cook, Do Women Leaders Promote Positive
Change? Analyzing the Effect of Gender on Business Practices and Diversity Initiatives,
57 HUM. RES. MGMT. 823 (2017).
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business and affairs of the corporation and acting in the best interest of the
corporation and its shareholders in fulfilling its fiduciary obligations.73 Boards serve
two important functions which address the agency costs inherent in the corporate
governance structure: monitoring and advising. As monitors, boards supervise
manager conduct to ensure that the incentives of management align with the
interests of shareholders. As advisors, directors use their experience and expertise
to guide management in designing corporate strategies and policies.
In line with the board’s fiduciary role, state corporate law generally requires
that the board of directors of a company involved in a merger transaction must
approve the transaction.74 Even if there is no statutorily defined role, in significant
acquisitions by public companies, some level of board involvement, including
seeking the board’s approval for the deal, is the norm.75 As part of their role as
fiduciaries, directors must undertake sufficient investigation and obtain all
reasonably available information regarding an M&A transaction. Due to their
statutory role as well as the threat of fiduciary duty litigation against target directors
in M&A deals, directors of the target often are heavily involved in the decision to
sell the company.76 For many boards, their primary involvement in the acquisition
process is an advisory and oversight role to ensure “a reality check on
management’s plans.”77

73. The board is charged with managing the affairs of the corporation and acting in the best
interest of the corporation and its shareholders in fulfilling its fiduciary obligations. See DEL. CODE
ANN. tit. 8, § 141 (2020). Directors’ fiduciary duty to the corporation encompasses two specific
duties: the duty of loyalty and the duty of care. The duty of loyalty requires directors to consider the
best interest of the corporation and its shareholders in making business decisions. If the director has a
chance to benefit personally (and apart from benefits to the company) from a transaction, the director
should remove himself from the transaction so as to avoid violation of his duty of loyalty to the
company. The directors’ duty of care requires them to inform themselves of all critical information
available to them prior to approving an acquisition. This includes evaluating, investigating, and
understanding expert opinions and terms for a transaction. Once the board is “informed” on a decision,
directors must act with the requisite care in performing their duties. See JAMES D. COX & THOMAS LEE
HAZEN, TREATISE ON THE LAW OF CORPORATIONS §§ 10.2–10.4, 10.11 (3d ed. 2010) (discussing the
duties of care and loyalty).
74. See CAL. CORP. CODE § 1200 (West 2019); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 251(b) (2020); MODEL
BUS. CORP. ACT § 11.04(a) (AM. BAR. ASS’N 2016); STEPHEN M. BAINBRIDGE, MERGERS AND
ACQUISITIONS 217–20 (3d ed. 2012).
75. See THERESE H. MAYNARD, MERGERS AND ACQUISITIONS CASES, MATERIALS, AND
PROBLEMS 29–30 (4th ed. 2017). The board of the bidder is not necessarily deeply involved in all
acquisitions “[ i ]f a very large company regularly buys smaller companies in its industry and has already
developed a process for finding, acquiring, and integrating these firms, boards need not focus on the
details of any particular transaction.” Alexandra R. Lajoux, Role of the Board in M&A,
HARV. L. SCH. F. ON CORP. GOVERNANCE (Sept. 7, 2015), https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2015/
09/07/role-of-the-board-in-ma/[ https://perma.cc/UX66-6W6L].
76. See BAINBRIDGE, supra note 74, at 57–60, 63–64; see also Matthew D. Cain & Steven
Davidoff Solomon, A Great Game: The Dynamics of State Competition and Litigation,
100 IOWA L. REV. 465, 475–77 (2015) (documenting the increase in merger litigation overall and the
number of suits filed in connection with each individual transaction).
77. Lajoux, supra note 75; see also TRACY BENARD, ROB COBLE & PHIL ISOM, KPMG, THE
BOARD’S PERSPECTIVES ON M&A: FROM DUE DILIGENCE TO DAY 1 AND BEYOND (2013),
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The central role that boards play in corporate governance has made the board
as an institution a target for gender diversity efforts.78 Advocates argue that gender
diversity on boards must be a priority for moral and social reasons as well as for
instrumental reasons—often referred to as the business case for board diversity.79
The business case for board diversity is a complex one that goes beyond financial
performance to also consider diversity as important for decision-making, effective
risk management, and establishment of egalitarian corporate cultures.80 Moreover,
scholars argue that the business case for diversity also considers the impact of
diversity “on the corporation’s reputation with regulators and all its key
stakeholders, and thus and by extension, on its cost of capital, access to talent and
business partners, and its attractiveness to customers.”81
The drive for board diversity has come from a variety of stakeholders.82 Not
only have reporting guidelines in corporate governance regulations focused on
diversity,83 but board gender diversity also has been vigorously pursued by investors,
particularly institutional investors,84 and even endorsed by board members and
corporate business leaders.85 For example, in early 2021, the Carlyle Group, a
leading private equity firm, announced that it would tie the price of debt to the
diversity of the board of its portfolio company.86 The Carlyle Group based its
http://www.kpmginfo.com/role-of-the-board/pdf/The%20Boards%20Perspective%20on%20MA.pdf
[ https://perma.cc/52M2-R2LV ].
78. See Nili, supra note 10, at 155–57.
79. For an overview of these arguments, see Nili, supra note 10, at 159–63. Some scholars have
defined the instrumental value for diversity as one that values diversity in the service of further ends,
but not as something valuable in itself. See Shin & Gulati, supra note 44, at 1020. Other scholars have
argued that an instrumental case can “exist alongside the moral and business case.” See Naomi Cahn,
June Carbone & Nancy Levit, The Instrumental Case for Corporate Diversity (on file with author).
80. See Brummer & Strine, supra note 45 (manuscript at 31–38); Miazad, supra note 7,
at 1938–41.
81. Brummer and Strine, supra note 45 (manuscript at 25).
82. See Fairfax, All on Board?, supra note 10, at 1040–43.
83. In some jurisdictions, mandatory disclosure requirements now call for companies to outline
their diversity policies and goals, and also to describe the steps taken to achieve these goals. See
EDWARD KAMONJOH, INSTITUTIONAL S’HOLDER SERVICES, GENDER DIVERSITY ON BOARDS: A
REVIEW OF GLOBAL TRENDS 3–4 (2014), https://www.issgovernance.com/file/publications/2014iss-global-board-diversity-report.pdf [ https://perma.cc/Q6W7-XPK7 ].
84. See Fairfax, All on Board?, supra note 10, at 1040–45; see also Todd A. Gormley,
Vishal K. Gupta, David A. Matsa, Sandra C. Mortal & Lukai Yang, The Big Three and Board Gender
Diversity: The Effectiveness of Shareholder Voice (European Corp. Governance Inst. in Fin., Working
Paper No. 714/2020, 2021), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3724653
[ https://perma.cc/UNU5-JP4L].
85. See Fairfax, All on Board?, supra note 10, at 1044–45. A variety of business groups have
advocated for board diversity. Id. For example, launched in the U.K. in 2010, the “30% Club” is an
organization committed to achieving a gender balance at all levels of organizations, including corporate
boards and C-suites. See Our Global Mission, 30% CLUB, https://www.30percentclub.org/about/whowe-are [ https://perma.cc/6ECV-ZKRR ] ( last visited Jan. 7, 2022 ). Currently, the 30% Club has
eighteen chapters throughout the world. See id.
86. See Lauren Hirsch, The Carlyle Group Ties a $4.1 Billion Credit Line to Board Diversity,
N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 17, 2021), https://www.nytimes.com/2021/02/17/business/the-carlyle-group-tiesa-4-1-billion-credit-line-to-board-diversity.html [ https://perma.cc/4KPS-F2PA].
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decision on internal research that showed that “the average earnings growth of
Carlyle portfolio companies with two or more diverse board members has been
approximately 12% greater per year than companies that lack diversity.”87
In addition to pressure from stakeholders, in some jurisdictions, mandatory
board diversity quotas have been introduced, modeled after the initial quotas in
leading countries such as Norway.88 For example, in 2018, California passed
legislation requiring that that publicly traded firms with a principal office in
California must include women on their boards.89 Data suggests that the California
statute has significantly increased the number of women on corporate boards.90
Moreover, other states have either passed or are considering legislation on board

87. Press
Release,
The
Carlyle
Group,
Carlyle
Announces
Largest
ESG-Linked Credit Facility in the US at $4.1 Billion and First-Ever Exclusively Tied to Board Diversity
(Feb. 17, 2021), https://www.carlyle.com/media-room/news-release-archive/carlyle-largest-esglinked-credit-facility-us-4-billion-board-diversity [ https://perma.cc/5VT3-2KZ7 ]. Carlyle defined
“diversity” as referring to female, Black, Hispanic, or Asian. JASON M. THOMAS & MEGAN STARR, THE
CARLYLE GRP., GLOBAL INSIGHTS: FROM IMPACT INVESTING TO INVESTING FOR IMPACT 5 (2020),
https://www.carlyle.com/sites/default/files/2020-02/From%20Impact%20Investing%20to%20
Investing%20for%20Impact_022420.pdf [ https://perma.cc/VG5G-V53F ].
88. See Rosenblum & Roithmayr, supra note 10. For example, in 2003, Norway became the first
country to impose a gender quota, mandating that corporate be composed of at least forty percent of
each gender, effectively mandating the addition of a significant number of female directors. Øyvind
Bøhren & Siv Staubo, Does Mandatory Gender Balance Work? Changing Organizational Form to Avoid
Board Upheaval, 28 J. CORP. FIN. 152, 152 (2014). The penalty of noncompliance is liquidation. Id.
89. See S. 826, Chapter 954 (Cal. 2018) (requiring publicly traded companies headquartered in
California to have at least one female director by the end of 2019 and at least two (three) female directors
on five (six or more) member boards by the end of 2021). For an analysis of the new California quota,
see generally Rosenblum, California Dreaming?, supra note 10, at 1435.
90. See Julie Hembrock Daum & Spencer Stuart, Fresh Perspectives: Increasing the Diversity of
Experience, Expertise, and Ideas in the Boardroom, in 2020 GOVERNANCE OUTLOOK: PROJECTIONS
ON EMERGING BOARD MATTERS 62, 62–63 (2019), https://www.spencerstuart.com/-/media/2019/
december/2020_nacd_governance_outlook_report.pdf [ https://perma.cc/6YPE-BUFE ]. Some also
argue that California’s efforts may prompt companies not directly impacted by the California law to
increase gender diversity on their boards and further prompt federal action on diversity on boards. See
Fairfax, All on Board?, supra note 10, at 1037–38.
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diversity disclosure or quotas.91 For example, Illinois,92 Maryland,93 and New York94
all mandate disclosure on gender diversity on boards, while Colorado95 and
Pennsylvania96 have passed resolutions to encourage board diversity. Washington
requires public companies incorporated in Washington to have gender-diverse
boards or “deliver to its shareholders a board diversity discussion and analysis.”97
The significant advocacy on board gender diversity has meant that board
gender diversity has outpaced the sluggish pace of gender diversity in the C-Suite.98
While women directors continue to remain underrepresented on corporate boards,
boards have seen a moderate increase in the proportion of women’s
representation.99 In 2008, approximately sixteen percent of board members of S&P

91. See Michael Hatcher & Weldon Latham, States Are Leading the Charge to Corporate
Boards: Diversify!, HARV. L. SCH. F. ON CORP. GOVERNANCE (May 12, 2020),
https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2020/05/12/states-are-leading-the-charge-to-corporate-boards-diversify/
[ https://perma.cc/B4LH-T5ZL]. States considering legislation on board diversity include Hawaii,
Massachusetts, Michigan, New Jersey, and Ohio. See id.; Joan Helwig, State Gender Diversity
Legislation: Status Updates, COGENCY GLOB. (Nov. 6, 2020), https://www.cogencyglobal.com/blog/
state-gender-diversity-legislation-status-updates [ https://perma.cc/G8BL-SVJL ].
92. On August 27, 2019, Governor J.B. Pritzker signed into law a bill, H.B. 3394, which requires
publicly traded businesses with principle executive offices in Illinois to file an annual report of the
number of women and minority board members with the Secretary of State. See H.R. 3394,
101st Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Ill. 2019).
93. Maryland law (H.B. 1116/S.B. 911), effective October 1, 2019, requires business entities
with corporate headquarters in Maryland with operating budgets over $5 million and domestic stock
corporations with sales over $5 million to report the number of female board members and the total
number of board members, as part of their annual personal property tax filing. See S. 911, 2019 Leg.,
Reg. Sess. (Md. 2019); see also Hatcher & Latham, supra note 91.
94. New York law also requires corporations to disclose the number of their board directors
and how many of their directors are women. Assemb. 6330, 2019–2020 Leg., Reg. Sess. (N.Y. 2019);
S. 4278, 2019–2020 Leg., Reg. Sess. (N.Y. 2019); see also Helwig, supra note 91.
95. In 2017, the Colorado legislature adopted a Joint Resolution encouraging “equitable and
diverse gender representation on corporate boards” with specific guidelines depending on board size.
H.R.J. Res. 17-1017, 71st Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Colo. 2017). The resolution is non-binding and
does not impose disclosure requirements. Id.; see also Hatcher & Latham, supra note 91.
96. Pennsylvania’s house resolution, H. Res. 114, encourages—but does not require—equitable
and diverse gender representation on boards of publicly held corporations in Pennsylvania by 2021.
H. Res. 114, 2019–2020 Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Pa. 2019).
97. S. 6037, 66th Leg., 2020 Reg. Sess. (Wash. 2020); see also Natalie Guevara, What to Know
About Washington’s New Rules for Boardroom Diversity, PUGET SOUND BUS. J. (Mar. 1, 2021,
2:31 AM), https://www.bizjournals.com/seattle/news/2021/02/28/washington-state-aims-to-makeboards-more-diverse.html [ https://perma.cc/CLN2-7RRK].
98. See Fairfax, All on Board?, supra note 10, at 1051–53. While there has been significant
progress on women’s representation on public company boards in the largest companies, small
companies still lag far behind. Id. at 1055–56. For private high-technology venture-backed companies,
women represent less than ten percent of board members. See Jennifer S. Fan, Innovating Inclusion: The
Impact of Women on Private Company Boards, 46 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 345, 374 (2019).
99. See Debbie McCormack & Robert Lamm, The 2020 Boardroom Agenda,
HARV. L. SCH. F. ON CORP. GOVERNANCE ( Jan. 20, 2020), https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2020/
01/20/the-2020-boardroom-agenda/ [ https://perma.cc/CA4J-KSTM ]. Women’s representation
in the boardrooms of the largest companies has outpaced that of non-white directors. See
Larcker & Tayan, supra note 45, at 5–7. The percentage of non-white directors among the Russell 3000
companies creeped up from eight percent in 2008 to ten percent in 2019. See id. at 6. These numbers

Clean Final Edit_Afsharipour_v2 (ET editrs).docx (Do Not Delete)

376

UC IRVINE LAW REVIEW

1/31/2022 10:48 AM

[ V ol. 12:359

500 board seats were held by women.100 By 2020, that number had moved up to
twenty-eight percent, with the recruitment of women board members gaining
steam.101 There remain concerns, however, that outside of the Fortune 500,
achievement of board gender diversity has been tougher, and public company
boards remain “a long way from gender parity.”102 For example, in 2019, women
constituted just nineteen percent of board members in the Russell 3000
companies.103 Furthermore, even in 2020, thirteen percent of boards in the Russell
3000 companies had zero women directors.104
Not only does gender parity appear to be out of reach, but also board diversity
efforts have yet to result in significant inclusion of women of color on boards.105
Annual studies conducted by Deloitte and the Alliance for Board Diversity on
women and minorities holding board seats for Fortune 500 companies show
“African American/Black women and Asian/Pacific Islander women made the
largest percentage increase in board seats gained in both the Fortune 100 and
Fortune 500.”106 Yet, the actual numbers remain very small. In 2018, Fortune 100
directors were comprised of 3.4% Black/African American women, and only 1.4%
and 0.9% of Fortune 100 directors were Asian/Pacific Islander and Latinx women,

are somewhat higher for the largest 200 companies in the United States, where minorities made up
twenty percent of all directors in 2020. See SPENCER STUART, supra note 21, at 17.
100. Larcker & Tayan, supra note 45, at 5; see also Elizabeth Olson, Slow Gains for Women and
Minorities on Boards of Big U.S. Firms, Study Says, N.Y. TIMES, ( Jan. 15, 2019),
https://www.nytimes.com/2019/01/15/business/women-minorities-corporate-boards.html [ https://
perma.cc/XS69-6K44 ] (documenting the slow progress of women and people of color on boards of
publicly traded companies).
101. See SPENCER STUART, supra note 21, at 3; Julie Daum, Laurel McCarthy & Ann Yerger,
Key Takeaways—2020 Board Index, HARV. L. SCH. F. ON CORP. GOVERNANCE ( Jan. 26, 2021),
https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2021/01/26/key-takeaways-2020-board-index [ https://perma.cc/
3HX7-DGF2 ].
102. Fairfax, All on Board?, supra note 10, at 1055–56; see also Kobi Kastiel & Yaron Nili, The
Corporate Governance Gap, 131 YALE L. J. (forthcoming 2022) (manuscript at 11),
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3824857 [ https://perma.cc/6RH8-VYQV ]
(stating that “small-cap companies are approximately ten years behind large-cap companies in terms of
board gender diversity”);. Fan, supra note 98, at 345, 368–75 (documenting gender disparities on board
of venture capital-backed private companies).
103. Larcker & Tayan, supra note 45, at 5.
104. The Conference Board, Report: Women on Russell 3000 Boards Increased by Just 4 Percent
Over 3 Years; Only 10 Percent of S&P 500 Companies Explicitly Identify Directors’ Race and Ethnicity,
CISION PR NEWSWIRE (Oct. 1, 2020, 9:00 AM), https://www.prnewswire.com/news-releases/reportwomen-on-russell-3000-boards-increased-by-just-4-percent-over-3-years-only-10-percent-of-sp-500companies-explicitly-identify-directors-race-and-ethnicity-301143701.html [ https://perma.cc/LT9K-PH3B].
105. In general, people of color remain underrepresented on boards. See Brummer & Strine,
supra note 45 (manuscript at 10–12); Lawrence J. Trautman, Corporate Boardroom Diversity: Why Are
We Still Talking About This?, 17 SCHOLAR 219, 241 (2015).
106. DELOITTE & ALLIANCE FOR BOARD DIVERSITY, supra note 20, at 6
(“African American/Black women saw an increase in seats of 26.2 percent in 2018, while Asian/Pacific
Islander women saw an increase of 38.6%.”).
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respectively.107 In fact, between 2016 and 2018, the percentage of Latinx women on
Fortune 100 boards decreased.108
There were similar trends of slow progress for women of color as Fortune 500
directors from 2016 to 2018, with the exception of Latinx women remaining
stagnant at 0.8%.109 Black women filled an additional thirty-two board seats in 2018
(a 26.2% increase from 2016), while Asian/Pacific Islander women saw an
impressive 38.6% increase with seventeen additional seats in 2018.110 A separate
2019 report on board diversity of S&P 500 companies found that ten percent of the
incoming 2019 S&P 500 directors were minority women, up slightly from nine
percent in 2018.111 Despite this upward trajectory, the figures are still negligible.112
Studies suggest that the pipeline of women, particularly women of color, into
director roles remains a significant challenge. Diverse executives hold fewer of the
positions that are most likely to be on the path of advancement towards corporate
board service.113 Recruitment practices for board membership, which often rely on
social and business networks of existing board members and executives, also
perpetuate the status quo of boards.114 Moreover, while companies face greater
incentives to prioritize the recruitment of diverse directors, slow-moving board
turnover rates may mean that few board seats will be available to be filled by women
and other diverse candidates.115
Even with an increase in gender diversity on boards, women remain
underrepresented in board leadership roles. Research shows that “substantive
gender diversity,” that is women holding leadership roles with clout in the
boardroom, remains elusive.116 Data from 2018 shows that only 4.3% of the
Fortune 500 board chair positions were held by Caucasian/White women, with only

107. DELOITTE & ALLIANCE FOR BOARD DIVERSITY, supra note 20 (showing an increase in
the representation of women of color in Fortune 100 board seats from 3.4% in 2010 to 5.8% in 2018).
108. Deb DeHaas et al., supra note 20, at 24 appendix 1 (displaying that board seats for
Black/African American women saw an increase from 2.4% in 2016 to 3.4% in 2018, and board seats
for Asian/Pacific Islander women saw an increase from 1.1% in 2016 to 1.4% in 2018).
109. See DELOITTE & ALLIANCE FOR BOARD DIVERSITY, supra note 20, at 32.
110. Id. at 22.
111. SPENCER STUART, 2019 U.S. SPENCER STUART BOARD INDEX HIGHLIGHTS (2019),
https://www.spencerstuart.com/-/media/2019/ssbi-2019/ssbi2019_highlights.pdf [ https://perma.cc/
QA8V-RYSL ].
112. See Daum, supra note 90, at 63. In addition to low numbers, there is concern about the
“‘recycle rate,’ or the rate at which individuals serve on multiple boards, when examining representation
of women and people of color on boards.” DELOITTE & ALLIANCE FOR BOARD DIVERSITY, supra
note 20, at 24. Research indicates that recycle rates are “higher for women and minorities than for
Caucasian/white men, showing that while the diversity of boards may be increasing, there is not
necessarily an equivalent rate of increase in the number of new women and minorities on boards.” Id.
113. See Larcker & Tayan, supra note 45, at 3.
114. See Cydney S. Posner, Addressing the Challenge of Board Racial Diversity,
HARV. L. SCH. F. ON CORP. GOVERNANCE (Sept. 8, 2020), https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2020/
09/08/addressing-the-challenge-of-board-racial-diversity/[ https://perma.cc/73MU-RFGK ].
115. See Daum & Stuart, supra note 101.
116. See Nili, supra note 10, at 152.
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two minority women serving as board chair in the Fortune 500.117 For M&A
transactions, substantive gender diversity may be particularly important as positions
such as board chair play a critical role in setting a board’s agenda, and board
members often view the chair as influential on board decisions.118
II. WOMEN AS M&A ADVISORS
As among corporate executives, there is a significant lack of female M&A
advisors. This trend is especially prevalent in leadership and management roles in
the legal and banking industries. Section A addresses the incremental changes in
gender diversity among legal advisors and efforts to add greater diversity to M&A
law practice. Section B then presents hand-collected data from the 100 largest public
company transactions in each year from 2014 to 2020. The study reveals the lack of
women as lead legal advisors in M&A transactions. Section C provides insight into
the factors contributing to gender disparities in M&A leadership at law firms.
Section D then examines women as leaders in the M&A investment banking
industry where there has been little systematic disclosure on leadership information.
While there have been few formalized studies focusing on gender diversity among
financial advisors in M&A, there is little doubt that M&A investment banking has
been and continues to be a “boys club.”119
A. Women as Legal Advisors
Legal advisors play an important role in M&A transactions and have a strong
effect on M&A outcomes.120 Inspired by Ronald Gilson’s seminal work on
transactional lawyering, scholars often characterize partners advising on M&A deals
as “transaction cost engineers” who help their clients create and claim value, thus
allowing deals to move forward.121 M&A legal advisors in large complex deals can
serve as reputational intermediaries between the parties and with important third

117. DELOITTE & ALLIANCE FOR BOARD DIVERSITY, supra note 20, at 26.
118. See Juliet Andrews & Sarah Ogilvie, The Omnipotent Chair: How Will History Judge You?,
EY (Sep. 4, 2020), https://www.ey.com/en_fi/workforce/the-omnipotent-chair-how-will-historyjudge-you [ https://perma.cc/6Z6A-R32W ].
119. Tom Terrarosa & Anders Keitz, Cracking the M&A Glass Ceiling: Why Corporate
Dealmaking Needs More Diversity and What It Will Take to Get It, DEALMAKER Q., 4, 7 (Q4 2018).
Senior leadership roles at large banks are dominated by white men. See STAFF OF
H.R. COMM. ON FIN. SERVS., 116TH CONG., DIVERSITY AND INCLUSION: HOLDING AMERICA’S
LARGE BANKS ACCOUNTABLE 16, 19 (Comm. Print 2020), https://docs.house.gov/
meetings/BA/BA13/20200212/110498/HHRG-116-BA13-20200212-SD003-U1.pdf [ https://
perma.cc/2TAR-BPKV]. For a historical account of women’s advancement on Wall Street, see
generally MELISSA S. FISHER, WALL STREET WOMEN (2012).
120. See C. N. V. Krishnan & Ronald W. Masulis, Law Firm Expertise and Merger and
Acquisition Outcomes, 56 J.L. & ECON. 189, 189 (2013).
121. Ronald J. Gilson, Value Creation by Business Lawyers: Legal Skills and Asset Pricing, 94
YALE L.J. 239, 254–55 (1984); see also Krishnan & Masulis, supra note 120, at 189, 192 (finding that
top-tier bidder law firms have strong incentives to facilitate successful completions of their clients’
M&A bids).
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parties, such as regulators.122 They are frequently regulatory experts or arbitrageurs
who understand how to use the law to structure deals so as to navigate, minimize,
and “avoid taxes, accounting rules, securities disclosure, and other regulatory
costs.”123 Furthermore, as Elisabeth de Fontenay has argued, transactional lawyers
draw on their expertise and experience to provide their clients private information
about “market” deal terms that give the client “a valuable bargaining advantage in
deal negotiations.”124 M&A lawyers are the epitome of the deal “quarterback” who
run a variety of complex plays to bring a deal to completion.125 Like quarterbacks
of major football teams, leading M&A partners are typically men “at the top of the
law firm pyramid”126 often “commanding premium billing rates.”127 In other words,
leading M&A partners often receive higher compensation and regularly have more
prestige and power at large law firms. Frequently the most highly compensated
attorneys at large law firms, leading M&A lawyers are high in demand and the target
of poaching by other large firms.128
M&A legal practice, especially at the top law firms, has long been viewed as
unwelcoming to women.129 As the data discussed below reveals, the gender disparity
in M&A practice groups is more significant than among law firms more generally.130
Surveys conducted over the last several years have shown slightly improved
numbers in overall diversity at law firms. Decades after women began to regularly
comprise a significant number of students attending law schools,131 approximately

122. See Steven L. Schwarcz, Explaining the Value of Transactional Lawyering,
12 STAN. J.L. BUS. & FIN. 486, 493, 500 (2007); Victor Fleischer, Regulatory Arbitrage,
89 TEX. L. REV. 227, 285–87 (2010). But see Elisabeth de Fontenay, Law Firm Selection and the Value
of Transactional Lawyering, 41 J. CORP. L. 393, 404 (2015).
123. Fleischer, supra note 122, at 227, 229.
124. de Fontenay, supra note 122, at 393, 396.
125. Victor Fleischer has aptly described transactional lawyers as “quarterbacks” to the deal.
Fleischer, supra note 122, at 227, 240–42.
126. Cathy Hwang, Value Creation by Transactional Associates, 88 FORDHAM L. REV. 1649,
1650 (2020).
127. Adam B. Badawi & Elisabeth de Fontenay, Is There a First-Drafter Advantage in M&A?,
107 CALIF. L. REV. 1119, 1120 (2019).
128. See James B. Stewart, $11 Million a Year for a Law Partner? Bidding War Grows at
Top-Tier Firms, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 26, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/04/26/business/
cravath-kirkland-ellis-partner-poaching.html [ https://perma.cc/6VSG-DKKG ].
129. Research shows that the legal profession is particularly unwelcoming to women of color.
See DESTINY PEERY, PAULETTE BROWN & EILEEN LETTS, LEFT OUT AND LEFT BEHIND: THE
HURDLES, HASSLES, AND HEARTACHES OF ACHIEVING LONG-TERM LEGAL CAREERS FOR WOMEN
OF COLOR (2020).
130. Professor Deborah Rhode’s comprehensive account of persistent gender inequalities in
the law shows that gender inequities in law firms are not unique to M&A practice alone. See RHODE,
supra note 45, at 77. Nevertheless, women have made significant progress in leadership in law firms.
At the largest law firms, women account for twenty-five percent of managing partner positions. See
COMM’N ON WOMEN IN THE PROFESSION, AM. BAR ASS’N, A CURRENT GLANCE AT WOMEN IN THE
LAW 3 (2018), https://www.nyipla.org/images/nyipla/Programs/2018December6/acurrentglance
atwomeninthelawjan2018.pdf [ https://perma.cc/4WKP-FM9G ].
131. See Jonathan D. Glater, Women Are Close to Being Majority of Law Students, N.Y. TIMES,
Mar. 26, 2001, at Al. By 2002, women constituted forty-nine percent of U.S. law students. AM. BAR
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twenty percent of equity partners at large law firms are women.132 Once refusing to
hire women,133 leading law firms now frequently tout their commitment to diversity,
including their commitment to developing communities with diversity in “gender
identity, . . . ethnicity, . . . LGBTQ+ status, ability, place of origin, language,
educational background, socioeconomic status, non-legal expertise and interests,
experience outside law and more.”134 But as the hand-collected data below
demonstrates, the reality in M&A presents a less rosy picture than these statements
of commitment.135
To address and understand gender disparities in M&A, one group of
researchers, including Jennifer Muller, the Chair of the American Bar Association’s
(ABA’s) Women in M&A Task Force, conducted a survey of more than 17,500
attorneys at twenty-five different law firms.136 The study first considered attorneys
across all practice groups. They found that gender discrepancy begins at the
associate level but becomes more pervasive as attorneys progress through their
career.137 Women made up forty-eight percent of first- and second-year associate
classes but only eighteen percent of senior equity partners, which they define as
those who have been partners for more than five years.138 M&A practice groups
saw this trend even more exaggerated. Women made up only forty percent of
ASS’N, FIRST YEAR AND TOTAL J.D. ENROLLMENT BY GENDER 1947–2011,
https://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/administrative/legal_education_and_admissions_to
_the_bar/statistics/jd_enrollment_1yr_total_gender.authcheckdam.pdf [ http://web.archive.org/web
/20220103113720/https://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/administrative/legal_education
_and_admissions_to_the_bar/statistics/jd_enrollment_1yr_total_gender.authcheckdam.pdf].
132. See Vivia Chen, Am Law 100 Firms that Are Failing Women, LAW.COM: THE
AM. LAW. ( June 25, 2020, 5:57 PM), https://www.law.com/americanlawyer/2020/06/25/am-law100-firms-that-are-failing-women/ [ https://perma.cc/983C-ZDFB ]. Data on partners at law firms
overall indicates that by 2020, women make up about twenty-five percent of all partners at law firms.
See NAT’L ASS’N FOR L. PLACEMENT, supra note 5, at 5. Nevertheless, there remains “a severe
underrepresentation of women and women of color in partnership ranks and a significant gender gap
in partner compensation.” Katrina Lee, Discrimination as Anti-Ethical: Achieving Systemic Change in
Large Law Firms, 98 DENV. L. REV. 581, 583 (2021).
133. See Eli Wald, Glass Ceilings and Dead Ends: Professional Ideologies, Gender Stereotypes, and
the Future of Women Lawyers at Large Law Firms, 78 FORDHAM L. REV. 2245, 2252 (2010); see also
Cynthia Grant Bowman, Women in the Legal Profession from the 1920s to the 1970s: What Can We
Learn from Their Experience about Law and Social Change?, 61 ME. L. REV. 1, 9–16 (2009).
134. Careers: Diversity, Equity, Inclusion, DAVIS POLK, https://www.davispolk.com/careers/
summer-programs/diversity-equity-and-inclusion [ https://perma.cc/2QVV-72U4 ] ( last visited
Nov. 14, 2021 ).
135. See Smith, supra note 28. There is also significant concern that the challenges wrought by
the COVID-19 pandemic will disproportionately impact women and attorneys of color, especially those
who are parents. Whittney Beard & Malini Nangia, ‘My Career Is Basically Over’: Working Parents Offer
Pleas for Empathy from Law Firms, LAW.COM: THE AM. LAW. ( Jan. 19, 2021, 11:33 AM),
https://www.law.com/americanlawyer/2021/01/19/my-career-is-basically-over-working-parentsoffer-pleas-for-empathy-from-law-firms/[ https://perma.cc/F9EU-58EL ].
136. Frankle et al., supra note 25.
137. See id.; Arlene Arin Hahn, Women in M&A: How to Get More Women to Stay in BIGLAW
M&A, WHITE & CASE (Mar. 28, 2019), https://www.whitecase.com/publications/article/womenma-how-get-more-women-stay-biglaw-ma [ https://perma.cc/3US2-DDV3 ].
138. See Hahn, supra note 137.
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first- and second-year M&A associate classes and only fifteen percent of M&A
senior equity partners.139 The authors conclude that this trend shows that the issue
begins from the outset: there are not enough women entering M&A practice.140
A second study conducted by the Women in M&A Task Force was completed
in 2016.141 This survey also found that forty percent of first- and second-year M&A
associates were female. The percentage of women as senior equity partners had
dropped to sixteen percent from the previous study’s finding of eighteen percent.142
This survey also noted that women made up thirty-six percent of all lawyers
surveyed but only thirty percent of M&A lawyers.143 A previous study conducted
by the Task Force had found that only twenty-seven percent of M&A attorneys
were women, compared to thirty-five percent of all attorneys.144
Moreover, neither the ABA’s Women in M&A Task Force nor law firm
initiatives address access to M&A practice for women of color. Nevertheless, the
reported numbers on women of color as leaders in law practice are bleak, as are the
experiences of many women of color at large firms.145 According to the 2020
National Association for Law Placement Report on Diversity in U.S. Law Firms, less
than four percent of law firm partners are women of color, a small increase from
about 1.5% in 2006.146 Women and associates of color exit the profession earlier
and report a variety of barriers to advancement.147
B. Gender Diversity of Leading M&A Advisors: Empirical Findings
While the percentage of women as lawyers and law firm partners in general
has increased, to better understand the leadership role women play in the M&A
profession, this Article surveys the number of women named as lead corporate
counsel for the top 100 (by dollar value) public company M&A transactions
announced in each year from 2014 to 2020—700 deals in total. These are all large
“bet the company” type transactions that are predominantly led by lawyers who
have the most significant clout and power in a large law firm. Appendix A provides
details of the methodology used to identify the deals and the lead lawyers advising
these deals.

139. Id.
140. Id.
141. Am. Bar Ass’n Women in M&A Taskforce, Strategies for Increasing the Level of
Participation and Retention of Women in M&A (Apr. 13, 2018); see also McLellan, supra note 26.
142. Am. Bar Ass’n Women in M&A Task Force, supra note 141.
143. Id.
144. Id.
145. See, e.g., TSEDALE M. MELAKU, YOU DON’T LOOK LIKE A LAWYER: BLACK WOMEN
AND SYSTEMIC GENDERED RACISM (2019).
146. NAT’L ASS’N FOR L. PLACEMENT, supra note 5, at 5. In 2020, Black women and Latinx
women accounted for less than one percent each of partners at law firms. Id.
147. See Joni Hersch & Erin E. Meyers, Why Are Seemingly Satisfied Female Lawyers Running
for the Exits? Resolving the Paradox Using National Data, 102 MARQ. L. REV. 915 (2019).

Clean Final Edit_Afsharipour_v2 (ET editrs).docx (Do Not Delete)

382

1/31/2022 10:48 AM

UC IRVINE LAW REVIEW

[ V ol. 12:359

Overall Picture
Figure 1 shows that women’s representation as lead corporate lawyer varies
from year to year but in general remains low.148 As lead counsel for the buyer, there
does not seem to be a linear pattern of increased or decreased representation of
women in lead counsel positions during the time period studied, hovering at an
average of 10.5% over the time period. On the seller/target side, the data shows an
increase in the share of women as lead lawyers from 2014 to 2020. This increase is
particularly pronounced since 2017.
The percentage of women as lead counsel in this dataset of large transactions
is lower than that reported for women partners generally. According to studies by
the National Association for Law Placement, by 2014, women constituted about
twenty-one percent of all partners at law firms, and by 2020, women made up about
twenty-five percent of all partners at law firms.149 With respect to law firms more
generally, scholars have emphasized that inequality “reigns within law partner
ranks” with men holding the power, prestige, and pay in large firms.150 The dataset
in this Article reveals that for large M&A transactions, inequality between men and
women is even more acute than in law firm leadership more generally.

Women as Share of Lead Counsel in Top 100
Deals (2014–2020)
25.0%
20.0%
15.0%
10.0%
5.0%
0.0%
2014

2015

2016
Buyer

2017

2018

2019

2020

Target

Figure 1: Women as Share of Lead Counsel in Top 100 Deals by Year (2014–2020)

For the 100 largest deals in terms of dollar value upon announcement over the
seven years between 2014 and 2020, Figure 2 shows that twenty-four women were
named as lead counsel on the buyer side out of 243 lead counsel, comprising, on
average, 10.1% of lead counsel roles. On the target side, thirty-three women were

148. Appendix B provides this data in greater detail on a year-by-year basis.
149. See NAT’L ASS’N FOR L. PLACEMENT, supra note 5, at 12.
150. Miranda McGowan, The Parent Trap: Equality, Sex, and Partnership in the Modern Law
Firm, 102 MARQ. L. REV. 1195, 1198–99 (2019). For a detailed account of inequality in law firm
partnership compensation, see Lee, supra note 132, at 589.

Clean Final Edit_Afsharipour_v2 (ET editrs).docx (Do Not Delete)

2022 ]

1/31/2022 10:48 AM

WOMEN AND M&A

383

named as lead counsel out of 263 lead counsel, comprising, on average, 12.43% of
lead counsel positions in the top 100.

Lead Counsel in 100 Largest Deals
(2014–2020)
250

230

219

200
150
100
50

33

24

0
Women

Men
Buyer

Women

Men
Target

Figure 2: Lead Counsel in Top 100 Deals (2014–2020)

Law Firms
One hundred and forty-six law firms were involved in the deals studied from
2014 to 2020 on both the target and buyer side. The majority of these firms
appeared in fewer than ten transactions. The top twenty law firms in terms of
number of transactions over the seven-year period account for almost half of all
lead counsel named from 2014 to 2020, and these transactions were in general the
largest. Figures 3A and 3B show the data for the top twenty law firms involved in
deals over the seven-year period. The data indicates that the predominance of men
as lead counsel is not driven by one firm alone. Other than at one firm in the data
set (Cooley LLP), men appear as lead counsel in much higher numbers than
women.151 Furthermore, the discrepancy in number of women versus men as lead
lawyers is particularly pronounced in the ten firms advising the greatest number of
transactions from 2014 to 2020.

151. Overall, Cooley only appears as lead counsel in forty-three of the transactions in the study,
while Wachtell Lipton, which has women named as lead counsel thirteen times over the seven-year
period, has advised on 266 of the transactions in the study.
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Total Number of Lead Counsel on Deals
2014–2020 (top 10 Firms)
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Wachtell Lipton Rosen & Katz
Skadden Arps Slate Meagher & Flom LLP
Kirkland & Ellis LLP
Latham & Watkins LLP
Sullivan & Cromwell LLP
Simpson Thacher & Bartlett LLP
Cravath, Swaine & Moore LLP
Weil Gotshal & Manges LLP
Paul Weiss Rifkind Wharton & Garrison
Davis Polk & Wardell LLP
Women

Men

Figure 3A: Total Number of Lead Counsel on Deals 2014–2020 (top 10 firms)

The most dominant law firm over the seven-year period of the data, Wachtell
Lipton Rosen & Katz, had a low proportion of women named as lead counsel. Six
women from Wachtell held thirteen named lead counsel roles on deals from 2014
to 2020, compared to forty men holding 299 roles. Of the top ten most active law
firms during the period studied, Skadden Arps Slate Meagher & Flom and Kirkland
& Ellis named the most unique women to their deal teams, but even then, men
vastly outnumbered women in total lead advisor roles. Women were severely
underrepresented at two leading firms, Davis Polk and Cleary Gottlieb
Steen & Hamilton, which named only two women to lead counsel positions from
2014 to 2020, compared to eighty-one and sixty men respectively. Only one firm,
Cooley, had the same number of women and men named as lead counsel.
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Total Number of Lead Counsel on Deals
2014–2020 (firms 11–20)
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Figure 3B: Total Number of Lead Counsel on Deals 2014–2020 (firms 11–20)

Unique Women as Lead Counsel
An analysis of the data showed that there was a greater likelihood for the same
men to be staffed on deals repeatedly throughout the years. This was true beyond
those lawyers representing clients who tended to be involved in multiple M&A
deals, such as Comcast. With respect to men named as lead counsel, 1,176 unique
men were named out of 2,757 men named as lead counsel. Of the 351 women
named as lead counsel from 2014 to 2020, there were 186 unique women involved.
While some of M&A’s leading women lawyers, such as Faiza Saeed (Cravath),
Elizabeth Cooper (Simpson Thacher), and Barbara Borden (Cooley), were involved
in multiple transactions throughout the years studied, 122 of the 186 unique women
(65.6%) were named as lead counsel in only one transaction. Fifteen women
appeared in the lead counsel list more than five times, together accounting for
ninety-nine out of 351 women (28%) named as lead counsel over the
seven-year period:
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Number of Transactions
2014–2020

Faiza J. Saeed (Cravath Swaine & Moore)

14

Elizabeth A. Cooper (Simpson, Thacher &
Bartlett)

12

Barbara L. Borden (Cooley)

9

Debbie P. Yee (Latham & Watkins)

9

Jamie K. Leigh (Cooley)

9

Lande A. Spottswood (Vinson & Elkins)

9

Taurie M. Zeitzer (Paul Weiss) (Kirkland &
Ellis)

9

Melissa Sawyer (Sullivan & Cromwell)

7

Audra D. Cohen (Sullivan & Cromwell)

6

Karessa L. Cain (Wachtell Lipton)

5

Lisa R. Haddad (Goodwin Procter)

5

Lizanne Thomas (Jones Day)

5

Marie L. Gibson (Skadden Arps)

5

Marni J. Lerner (Simpson Thacher)

5

Renee Wilm (Baker Botts)

5
Deal Teams

From 2014 to 2020, the percentage of deal teams that included at least one
woman as a named partner tended to increase. In 2014, around nineteen percent of
deal teams included a woman as at least one named partner. This number rose to
thirty percent in 2020. While it was fairly uncommon to have only one lead counsel
for these large transactions, if there was only one person named, it was usually a
man. For example, twenty-eight deal teams named only one lead counsel in 2014,
and only two of those teams were led by women. The number of deal teams where
only women were named as lead counsel, with either one or multiple lead counsel
positions, stayed roughly the same throughout the time studied, with a slight
increase in 2020.
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Women on Deal Teams in Top 100 Deals
(2014–2020)
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Figure 4: Percentage of Deal Teams with Women as Named Lead Counsel 2014–2020

In sum, this study presents several trends regarding women’s representation
in the top 700 public M&A deals from 2014 to 2020. Women, on average, were
more likely to be named as lead counsel when representing a target rather than a
buyer. The percentage of women named as lead counsel for the top 100 M&A deals
remained constant on the buyer side, with a slight increase from 2017 to 2020 on
the target side. One substantial difference in the data through the years is the
number of deal teams with at least one woman named as lead counsel, which
increased significantly from 2018 to 2020. However, because most patterns in the
data through the years studied are minor and nonlinear, it may be premature to say
there is a trend showing women are increasingly holding more lead
counsel positions.
C. Barriers to the Advancement of Women as Lead M&A Advisors
Decades after women have entered law schools, including the most elite
schools, in significant numbers, the empirical study in this Article shows that they
remain vastly underrepresented as leaders in M&A legal practice.
The underrepresentation of women as leaders in M&A has important
implications for women lawyers more generally. M&A leaders are typically high in
demand and highly compensated.152 M&A practice is often associated with high
billing rates, often significantly higher than other practice groups.153 Studies show
that women’s compensation at large firms often lags behind that of men, even for
152.
153.

See supra notes 126–128.
See Julie Triedman, Report Sees Top Deal Lawyers Pull Ahead as Billing Rates Soar,
LAW.COM: THE AM. LAW. (May 24, 2016, 1:19 PM), https://www.law.com/americanlawyer/almID/
1202758508378/report-sees-top-deal-lawyers-pull-ahead-as-billing-rates-soar/ [ https://perma.cc/
H9H6-MYAJ ]; Badawi & de Fontenay, supra note 127.
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equity partners.154 Studies find that “men are overwhelmingly the top earners in
large firms, with 93% of firms reporting that their most compensated partner is a
man and of the 10 top earners in the firm, either one or none is a woman.”155 The
gender pay gap for women partners does not appear to be connected to the number
of hours women bill but is instead due to differences in their billing rates and
client billings.156
A variety of factors contribute to women’s underrepresentation in M&A
leadership. These include biases (both explicit and implicit) about women and
perceptions about the necessary attributes for successful M&A practice; promotion,
credit, and pay disparities that often result in attrition of women attorneys; a lack of
flexibility in law practice overall, especially in high-end M&A practice; and a lack of
significant efforts by large firms to advance gender diversity in meaningful ways.
1. Explicit and Implicit Biases
The data in this Article finds that the percentage of women as leaders in large
M&A deals is even less than the percentage of women in law firm partnerships
more generally. Thus, even women who have made the investment and sacrifice to
achieve partnership are not leading the largest deals. Moreover, men who lead deals
tend to do so repeatedly, while women are more likely to be deal leaders on a
one-time or more sporadic basis. While more research, including qualitative
interviews with M&A leaders, is needed to explicate these disparities, current
research suggests that biases may play an important role in M&A practice.157
Many current M&A leaders describe the long-standing male domination of
M&A law practice.158 Sarah Hewitt, a partner at the mid-sized law firm Schnader
Harrison Segal & Lewis, described what it was like to be a woman M&A attorney
in the 1980s: “The men used to go into the men’s room to decide how they were
going to respond to deal terms or how they were going to negotiate.”159 Because
Hewitt could not go in with them, she would wait outside.160 One of Hewitt’s
154.
155.
156.

Lee, supra note 132, at 588–89.
Liebenberg & Scharf, supra note 25, at 1.
DESTINY PEERY, NAT’L ASS’N OF WOMEN LAWS., 2019 SURVEY REPORT ON THE
PROMOTION AND RETENTION OF WOMEN IN LAW FIRMS 6 (2019); see also Lee, supra note 132,
at 589.
157. In a future project, I hope to further the findings in this Article by focusing on law firms
more specifically and conduct in-depth interviews with senior M&A lawyers.
158. See Patrick Smith, ‘The Problem Is It Isn’t Improving Fast Enough’: High-Profile Women
M&A Attorneys Weigh in on Fixing Inequity in Big M&A, LAW.COM: THE AM. LAW. ( Jan. 19, 2021,
5:10 AM), https://www.law.com/americanlawyer/2021/01/19/the-problem-is-it-isnt-improving-fastenough-high-profile-women-ma-attorneys-weigh-in-on-fixing-inequity-in-big-ma/[ https://perma.cc/
5LD7-HAQJ ]. [ Reports indicate that much of the male domination of M&A practice has also resulted
in the exclusion of lawyers of color, especially Black lawyers, who are “scarce” in dealmaking. Elizabeth
Olson, In the World of Big Law Dealmaking, Black Lawyers Are Scarce, BLOOMBERG L. ( July 15, 2021,
2:55 AM), https://news.bloomberglaw.com/business-and-practice/in-the-world-of-big-law-dealmaking
-black-lawyers-are-scarce [ https://perma.cc/XNC8-5T92 ].
159. McLellan, supra note 26.
160. Id.
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colleagues described standing outside of a meeting room telling a male colleague
what to say because their client would not take advice from a woman lawyer.161 With
a greater number of women in professional roles, such practices have dissipated
somewhat. As Kathryn King Sudol, an M&A partner at Simpson Thacher
stated: “I’m not sure how optimistic I am that there’s going to be a dramatic
shift . . . [a]t the same time, I think the ‘I’m-the-only-woman-in-a-room-of-50’ thing
is a thing of the past.”162
In M&A practice, which tends to be more confrontational than other areas of
transactional law, women often report being judged more harshly if they are
perceived as aggressive or combative, but they also report expectations that M&A
attorneys will act aggressively.163 For example, Sudol described the perception of
M&A attorneys being “the type of people who . . . were more aggressive, voluble
people who were pound-on-the-table people.”164 In many ways, perceptions about
leadership in M&A law practice mirror the norms deemed necessary for success in
corporate leadership.165
With respect to corporate leadership, leading social psychologist Alice Eagly’s
role congruity theory describes the significant challenges women executives face in
their rise to leadership because of inconsistent stereotypes about the typical
attributes of an effective leader and typical attributes expected from women.166
While traditionally masculine attributes, including dominance and assertiveness, are
seen as necessary to leadership, when women are assertive or decisive, they are
viewed as unlikable.167 In other words, “[w]omen who . . . seek leadership positions
are subject to double standards and double binds.”168
Biases, both explicit and subtle, also play a significant role in the pipeline of
women to leadership in M&A practice in the law. Numerous studies have
documented the inferior experience of women in law firms relative to men, noting

161. Id.
162. Id.
163. The experience of women M&A lawyers resembles that of other women and minorities
leaders in other high-stakes and competitive corporate environments. See Jennifer L. Berdahl, Marianne
Cooper, Peter Glick, Robert W. Livingston & Joan C. Williams, Work as a Masculinity Contest,
74 J. SOC. ISSUES 422, 430–32 (2018); Andrea C. Vial, Jaime L. Napier & Victoria L. Brescoll, A Bed of
Thorns: Female Leaders and the Self-Reinforcing Cycle of Illegitimacy, 27 LEADERSHIP Q. 400 (2016).
164. McLellan, supra note 26.
165. See Alice H. Eagly & Steven J. Karau, Role Congruity Theory of Prejudice Toward Female
Leaders, 109 PSYCH. REV. 573 (2002); S. Alexander Haslam & Michelle K. Ryan, The Road to the Glass
Cliff: Differences in the Perceived Suitability of Men and Women for Leadership Positions in Succeeding and
Failing Organizations, 19 LEADERSHIP Q. 530 (2008).
166. See Eagly & Karau, supra note 165.
167. See Amelia Costigan, The Double-Bind Dilemma for Women in Leadership (Infographic),
CATALYST (Aug. 2, 2018), https://www.catalyst.org/research/infographic-the-double-bind-dilemmafor-women-in-leadership/ [ https://perma.cc/Q4PT-H6F6 ].
168. RHODE, supra note 45, at 11.
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the experience of disrespect,169 bias,170 discrimination and harassment,171 and social
constraints.172 In M&A practice, many women attorneys report that they continue
to “encounter interruptions, reiterations of what they just said by a man in the room
and, of course, ‘mansplaining.’”173
Biases against women lawyers also “affect the allocation of work assignments
to them, because partners may assume that a woman lawyer cannot handle a
high-status project as well as a male colleague could, or that she is too busy with
familial commitments.”174 Women are often assigned support work while men are
given the plum assignments that further enhance their leadership and
client connections.175
Biases against women also are often coupled with “in-group favoritism”176 and
many firms’ lack of standardized processes for client relationship management and
succession planning.177 Especially for elite M&A practice—a field long dominated
by white men—these factors can result in women and minority lawyers being
disfavored from attaining leadership positions.178 For example, a well-respected
169. See Liane Jackson, Why Do Experienced Female Lawyers Leave? Disrespect, Social
Constraints, ABA Survey Says, ABA J. (Aug. 3, 2018, 7:50 PM), https://www.abajournal.com/news/
article/why_do_experienced_female_lawyers_leave_disrespect_social_constraints_ABA [ https://
perma.cc/CT9N-DJPU ].
170. See, e.g., Elizabeth H. Gorman, Gender Stereotypes, Same-Gender Preferences, and
Organizational Variation in the Hiring of Women: Evidence from Law Firms, 70 AM. SOCIO. REV. 702
(2005); Lee Rawles, Why Are Women Lawyers Leaving the Profession Mid-Career? ABA Initiative Takes
Up Issue, ABA. J. (Nov. 15, 2017, 7:00 AM), https://www.abajournal.com/news/
article/why_are_women_lawyers_leaving_the_profession_mid_career_aba_initiative_hope [ https://
perma.cc/TJ9F-TDYD ]; Justin D. Levinson & Danielle Young, Implicit Gender Bias in the Legal
Profession: An Empirical Study, 18 DUKE J. GENDER L. & POL’Y 1 (2010); JOYCE STERLING & LINDA
CHANOW, IN THEIR OWN WORDS: EXPERIENCED WOMEN LAWYERS EXPLAIN WHY THEY ARE
LEAVING THEIR LAW FIRMS AND THE PROFESSION 19, 21–22 (2021).
171. See Fiona Kay & Elizabeth Gorman, Women in the Legal Profession,
4 ANN. REV. L. & SOC. SCI. 299, 306–07 (2008).
172. See Kathleen E. Hull & Robert L. Nelson, Assimilation, Choice, or Constraint? Testing
Theories of Gender Differences in the Careers of Lawyers, 79 SOC. FORCES 229 (2000).
173. See Smith, supra note 158.
174. ANNA JAFFE, GRACE CHEDIAK, ERIKA DOUGLAS & MACKENZIE TUDOR, STANFORD
L. SCH., WOMEN IN L. POL’Y LAB PRACTICUM, RETAINING & ADVANCING WOMEN IN NATIONAL
LAW FIRMS 13 (2016), https://www-cdn.law.stanford.edu/wp-content/uploads/2016/05/Women-inLaw-White-Paper-FINAL-May-31-2016.pdf [ https://perma.cc/3MFW-V4XC ].
175. See Joan C. Williams & Marina Multhaup, For Women and Minorities to Get Ahead,
Managers Must Assign Work Fairly, HARV. BUS. REV. (Mar. 5, 2018). https://hbr.org/2018/03/forwomen-and-minorities-to-get-ahead-managers-must-assign-work-fairly
[ https://perma.cc/7Z3R9TUV]; Joan C. Williams & Veta Richardson, New Millennium, Same Glass Ceiling? The Impact of Law
Firm Compensation Systems on Women, 62 HASTINGS L.J. 597, 644–46 (2011).
176. Research indicates that “[ l ]oyalty, cooperation, favorable evaluations, and opportunities all
increase in likelihood” when individuals interact with members of their own group. RHODE, supra note
45, at 16.
177. See PEERY, supra note 156, at 7–8.
178. For how subjectivity can couple with bias to disfavor women lawyers, especially in
male-dominated environments, see Williams & Richardson, supra note 175, at 647–51. M&A partners
comment on the “clubby atmosphere” of M&A practice, “where you work hard and play hard, close a
deal and pound down a few.” Olson, supra note 158.
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M&A partner at Skadden Arps—one of the country’s largest law firms and a leader
in M&A practice—noted that “client handoff often favors men” and that “[a]t most
firms historically the most powerful partners were white men, even here at Skadden.
A lot of times the handoff is to a partner that the relationship partner feels is most
like them, and thinks the client would be most comfortable with them.”179 These
statements are consistent with research that indicates that men are more likely than
women to “‘inherit’ institutional clients—either as the sole or co-lead partner on
major accounts.”180
The biased experiences faced by women lawyers are heightened for women
with children.181 Interviews of experienced women lawyers are replete with stories
of the discrimination they experienced once they had children.182 For high-end
M&A practice, often considered one of the most fast-paced, unpredictable, and
demanding areas of law practice, the issue of family responsibilities is a vexing one.
“[M]others, even those working full-time, are assumed to be less available and
committed, an assumption not made about fathers.”183 As Alison Ressler, a leading
M&A Partner at Sullivan & Cromwell in Los Angeles, recounted, “everyone told
me you can’t have kids and do it”; she rejected that notion, however.184 Other
leading women M&A lawyers, however, acknowledge that having a supportive
spouse, for example a husband with primary home care responsibilities, has allowed
them to advance their careers.185
Overall, research suggests that gender bias plays a significant role in women’s
underrepresentation in M&A leadership, as it does in women’s underrepresentation
in leadership roles generally.186 Even women who have risen to leadership positions
in M&A repeatedly report experiencing both overt and more subtle biases.187
Moreover, gender and racial bias, and the intersection of the two, continue to lead
to the underrepresentation of women of color as leaders in the legal profession.188

179. See Smith, Fixing Inequity, supra note 158.
180. Heidi Gardner, Harvard Study: On Gender and Origination in the Legal Profession
(Perspective), BLOOMBERG L. (Nov. 3, 2016, 8:41 AM), https://news.bloomberglaw.com/business
-and-practice/harvard-study-on-gender-and-origination-in-the-legal-profession-perspective [ https://
perma.cc/LR5C-ULZW ].
181. See McGowan, supra note 150, at 1206–07; JOAN C. WILLIAMS & RACHEL DEMPSEY,
WHAT WORKS FOR WOMEN AT WORK: FOUR PATTERNS WORKING WOMEN NEED TO KNOW
132–34 (2014).
182. See STERLING & CHANOW, supra note 170.
183. RHODE, supra note 45, at 80.
184. McLellan, supra note 26.
185. Id.
186. See RHODE, supra note 45, at 57–64, 79–83.
187. See generally MERGERMARKET & TOPPAN VINTAGE, WOMEN DEALMAKERS: GAINING A
SEAT AT THE TABLE ( 2018), https://www.mergermarket.com/info/women-dealmakers-gaining-seattable [ https://perma.cc/LW36-6PZM ].
188. See PEERY ET AL., supra note 129.
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2. Structural Biases in the Practice of M&A
Scholars have long argued that “[e]scalating workplace demands and inflexible
workplace structures pose . . . obstacles to gender equity” in law firms.189 Research
has identified these structural factors as significant in perpetuating gender
disparities in the legal profession.190 Feminist scholars argue that without changing
the norms of the workplace, gender disparities will persist.191
Anecdotal evidence from women leaders identifies the long hours and
structure of M&A practice as factors in gender disparities in M&A leadership.192 As
stated by a leading M&A practitioner, “[t]here is the perception that the lifestyle of
an M&A lawyer is significantly worse than other areas of big law.”193 M&A is often
perceived as even more unpredictable than other practice areas, with lawyers
working extremely long hours if they are trying to sign a large deal. Thus, M&A
leaders point out that women, for whom family issues loom more significantly
because of existing gender roles,194 may select out of a transactional practice area
that is perceived as extremely focused on client interaction and meeting client
demands. Or it may be that M&A attorneys who are forced into part-time or

189. RHODE, supra note 45, at 83; see also DEBORAH L. RHODE, AM. BAR ASS’N, COMM’N ON
WOMEN IN THE PROFESSION, BALANCED LIVES: CHANGING THE CULTURE OF LEGAL PRACTICE
23–24 (2001), http://womenlaw.stanford.edu/pdf/balanced.lives.pdf [ https://perma.cc/4GGY-FCTK].
190. See, e.g., RONIT DINOVITZER, BRYANT G. GARTH, RICHARD SANDER, JOYCE STERLING,
& GITA Z. WILDER, AM. BAR FOUND. & NAT’L ASS’N FOR L. PLACEMENT, AFTER THE JD: FIRST
RESULTS OF A NATIONAL STUDY OF LEGAL CAREERS (2004), http://www.
americanbarfoundation.org/uploads/cms/documents/ajd1_final_report_for_distribution.pdf
[ https://perma.cc/B2ST-GC6R ]; RONIT DINOVITZER, ROBERT L. NELSON, GABRIELE PLICKERT,
REBECCA SANDEFUR, JOYCE S. STERLING, TERRY K. ADAMS, BRYANT G. GARTH, JOHN HAGAN,
GITA Z. WILDER & DAVID B. WILKINS, AM. BAR FOUND. & NAT’L ASS’N FOR L. PLACEMENT, AFTER
THE JD II: SECOND RESULTS FROM A NATIONAL STUDY OF LEGAL CAREERS (2009),
https://www.law.du.edu/documents/directory/publications/sterling/AJD2.pdf [ https://perma.cc/
6T3T-NKQ5 ]; RONIT DINOVITZER, BRYANT G. GARTH, ROBERT NELSON, GABRIELE PLICKERT,
REBECCA SANDEFUR, JOYCE STERLING & DAVID WILKINS, AM. BAR FOUND. & NAT’L ASS’N FOR
L. PLACEMENT, AFTER THE JD III: THIRD RESULTS FROM A NATIONAL STUDY OF LEGAL CAREERS
(2014), http://www.americanbarfoundation.org/uploads/cms/documents/ajd3report_final_for_
distribution.pdf [ https://perma.cc/EAM5-LEVS ].
191. See, e.g., JOAN WILLIAMS, UNBENDING GENDER: WHY FAMILY AND WORK CONFLICT
AND WHAT TO DO ABOUT IT (2000).
192. Research has found that round-the-clock availability and the demands of “greedy
professions” such as law have in general exacerbated gender inequality. See Claire Cain Miller, Women
Did Everything Right. Then Work Got ‘Greedy’, N.Y. TIMES: THEUPSHOT (Apr. 26, 2019),
https://www.nytimes.com/2019/04/26/upshot/women-long-hours-greedy-professions.html [ https://
perma.cc/SVU7-7H52 ].
193. MERGERMARKET & TOPPAN VINTAGE, supra note 187, at 3.
194. See DEBORAH L. RHODE, WHAT WOMEN WANT: AN AGENDA FOR THE WOMEN’S
MOVEMENT 59 (2014). Research has found that the inflexibility of a woman’s work environment plays
a causal role in “pushing” her out of the labor force at motherhood. See generally Jane Leber
Herr & Catherine D. Wolfram, Work Environment and Opt-Out Rates at Motherhood Across
High-Education Career Paths, 65 ILR REV. 928 (2012). Moreover, in families with parents who are
professionals, traditional gender roles persist, with women doing the vast bulk of caretaking. See Jane
R. Bambauer & Tauhidur Rahman, The Quiet Resignation: Why Do So Many Female Lawyers Abandon
Their Careers?, 10 UC IRVINE. L. REV. 799, 827–29 (2020).
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flexible work policies because of caregiving responsibilities—often women—are
overlooked for promotion or leadership positions.195
While there is widespread recognition of the work-life imbalance in M&A
practice, as Deborah Rhode and other scholars have long noted, leaders of the bar
and law firms “often place responsibility for addressing [imbalances] anywhere and
everywhere else.”196 Studies of law firm practices indicate that while large law firms
are willing to undertake some bias reduction efforts, such as using administrative
staff for administrative tasks or offering implicit bias trainings, few firms are willing
to make structural changes that may support women as they progress in their
careers.197 Without a sufficient number of women leaders, the incentives to address
major structural issues in M&A practice, as well as the support and mentorship
needed to do so, may be less.198
Women leaders in M&A frequently comment on the importance of women
role models and mentors, and they also lament the persistent lack of sufficient role
models.199 As noted in a 2021 article in the American Lawyer, “[i]f having a strong
female mentor in a position of authority, such as the lead on a deal and the owner
of a client relationship, is paramount to facilitating other women into that position,
you first need to have enough women in those prominent roles. There are not.”200
Instead, much of M&A practice and advancement seems to rely on social contacts
and client development norms that perpetuate the exclusion of women and people
of color from leadership in practice.201
3. Promotion, Credit, and Pay Disparities
The disparities in women’s leadership in M&A legal practice reflect leaks in
the pipeline of women from the associate level to the partnership level. Studies show
that women and minority lawyers exit the profession earlier and report a variety of

195. Economist Claudia Goldin’s research shows that “many occupations have severe penalties
for shorter and more-flexible hours” and provide “large windfalls to those who work hours that are less
controllable.” Claudia Goldin, Tackle Gender Inequality at Home and at Work, CHI. BOOTH REV. (May
15, 2019), https://review.chicagobooth.edu/economics/2019/article/tackle-gender-inequality-homeand-work [ https://perma.cc/K5K8-X4ZN ].
196. RHODE, supra note 45, at 85.
197. See PEERY, supra note 156, at 9–14.
198. Research shows that access to leadership opportunities requires “commitment from their
leadership that is reflected in workplace policies and practices.” Deborah L. Rhode, Leadership in Law,
69 STAN. L. REV. 1603, 1659 (2017).
199. See Smith, Fixing Inequity, supra note 158. For more on the importance of mentoring, see
Frank Dobbin & Alexandra Kalev, The Architecture of Inclusion: Evidence from Corporate Diversity
Programs, 30 HARV. J.L. & GENDER 279, 295 (2007); Frank Dobbin, Alexandra Kalev & Erin Kelly,
Diversity Management in Corporate America, CONTEXTS, Fall 2007, at 21, 24.
200. Smith, Fixing Inequity, supra note 158.
201. Id. In this way, M&A practice resembles elite legal practice generally where leadership
experiences and mentorship are “reserved for those who have traditionally been granted a large amount
of privilege within the profession.” Veronica Root Martinez, Combating Silence in the Profession, 105
VA. L. REV. 805, 819 (2019); see also Veronica Root, Retaining Color, 47 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 575,
617–18 (2014) (describing the lack of mentorship for Black and Latinx attorneys).
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barriers to advancement.202 Even in senior levels, women are much more likely to
leave large law firms than men.203
Some research connects the more limited opportunities for promotion, as well
as the gender pay gap for women lawyers, including those in partnership levels, with
the exodus of experienced women lawyers.204 For M&A practice specifically, the
extent to which the gender pay gap and advancement disparities are connected with
the disparities in women holding leadership roles needs to be further investigated.
Nonetheless, an ABA study found that pay disparity was the most frequently noted
reason for experienced women lawyers leaving law firms.205 Much of the pay
disparity relates to the commonly used structures of partner compensation systems,
with partners that originate deals—and are thus often recognized as the lead lawyer
for a transaction—receiving substantial compensation credit.206 Thus, even for
women that rise to law firm partnership, “biases combined with law firm structure
and the absence of objective criteria for evaluating performance reduce women’s
income and the credit they get for bringing in business.”207
D. Women as M&A Financial Advisors
Large M&A deals are rarely undertaken by companies without the
involvement of financial advisors hired by each company involved in the deal.208
Financial advisors are key to management and board decision-making in M&A
deals, bringing with them the necessary “expertise and experience to conceive,
structure, and execute” complex transactions.209 Some M&A deals can even begin
due to the efforts of financial advisors. For example, a financial advisor can bring
to the attention of a buyer a potential acquisition candidate “at the request of its
client or, alternatively, as part of the banker’s ongoing professional relationship with
that particular corporate client.”210 In other acquisitions, the deal might be instigated
by company management, but eventually sellers, and often buyers, will commonly
retain financial advisors.

202.
203.

See Hersch & Meyers, supra note 147.
See MARC BRODHERSON, LAURA MCGEE & MARIANA PIRES DOS REIS,
MCKINSEY & CO., WOMEN IN LAW FIRMS 4 (2017); see also Roberta Liebenberg, Too Many Senior
Women are Leaving the Profession, LAW PRAC. TODAY (Nov. 14, 2018), https://
www.lawpracticetoday.org/article/many-senior-women-leaving-profession/
[ https://perma.cc/
4PVY-YM9P ].
204. See STERLING & CHANOW, supra note 170, at 8–12; Lee, supra note 132, at 591–92.
205. See STERLING & CHANOW, supra note 170, at 8.
206. See Lee, supra note 132, at 593–97; Williams & Richardson, supra note 175, at 674. For
more on how origination credit contributes to gender disparities and structural discrimination, see
Martinez, supra note 201, at 837–38.
207. McGowan, supra note 150, at 1208.
208. See Andrew F. Tuch, Banker Loyalty in Mergers and Acquisitions, 94 TEX. L. REV. 1079,
1088–89 (2016).
209. Id. at 1088.
210. MAYNARD, supra note 75, at 19.
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Financial advisors, especially at the leadership level, resemble their clients: they
are dominated by white men.211 “Wall Street has never been hospitable to women,”
and masculinity norms pervade the financial services industry.212 Numerous
reporting highlights the male-dominated banking and finance industry.213 A 2011
article in Reuters notes that women made up only 15.3% of executive and senior
level managers in U.S. investment banks in 2009. Ten years later, these numbers
have inched upward with recent studies indicating that women account for almost
seventeen percent of senior leaders in investment banking by 2018.214 With respect
to women of color, there is little data on their leadership in M&A financial advisory
work.215 The studies on women of color in financial services more broadly paint a
bleak picture.216 Few women of color are in leadership positions at financial
institutions overall, with women of color making up only three percent of senior
vice presidents.217
The numbers on women’s leadership in the financial services industry underlie
the perception that investment banking is a male-dominated industry.218 Interviews
with women M&A advisors often include comments such as “I am often the only
woman in the room” or “women represent a shockingly small portion of the

211. See Frankle et al., supra note 25; Mortlock, supra note 25. There is almost no disclosure on
racial diversity in investment banking, but anecdotal evidence suggests that the numbers are even lower
than they are for gender. See Paul Clarke & David Ricketts, The Race and Ethnicity Gap: Finance Sector’s
Deafening Silence on Diversity in Its Ranks, FIN. NEWS ( June 29, 2020, 8:11 AM),
https://www.fnlondon.com/articles/black-lives-matter-finance-20200629
[ https://perma.cc/
X2SN-WHB7 ].
212. See June Carbone, Naomi Cahn & Nancy Levit, Women, Rule-Breaking, and the Triple Bind,
87 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1105, 1141 (2019); see also Kristin N. Johnson, Banking on Diversity: Does
Gender Diversity Improve Financial Firms’ Risk Oversight?, 70 SMU L. REV. 327, 329, 331 (2017);
Christine Sgarlata Chung, From Lily Bart to the Boom-Boom Room: How Wall Street’s Social and Cultural
Response to Women Has Shaped Securities Regulation, 33 HARV. J.L. & GENDER 175, 177 (2010).
213. See Cahn et al., supra note 31, at 456; see also Mortlock, supra note 25; Davies & Bansal,
supra note 31; Hyder, supra note 31.
214. Julia Boorstin, Survey: It’s Still Tough to Be a Woman on Wall Street – but Men Don’t
Always Notice, CNBC ( June 26, 2018, 6:30 AM), https://www.cnbc.com/2018/06/25/surveyon-wallstreet-workplace-biases-persist—-but-men-dont-see-t.html [ https://perma.cc/3LX9-DHMK ].
215. As reports indicate “racism has been baked into the American banking system.” Emily
Flitter, This Is What Racism Sounds Like in the Banking Industry, N.Y. TIMES ( July 13, 2021),
https://www.nytimes.com/2019/12/11/business/jpmorgan-banking-racism.html [ https://perma.cc/
2329-YF89 ].
216. See Stacey Chin, Alexis Krivkovich & Marie-Claude Nadeau, Closing the
Gap: Leadership Perspectives on Promoting Women in Financial Services, MCKINSEY
& CO. (Sept. 6, 2018), https://www.mckinsey.com/industries/financial-services/our-insights/closingthe-gap-leadership-perspectives-on-promoting-women-in-financial-services
[ https://perma.cc/26DYAH47 ]; Arelis Diaz, La June Montgomery Tabron, Carlos Rangel, Joel Wittenberg, Stefon Burns, Aria
Florant, Stacey Haas, Max Magni & Paula Ramos, Racial Equity in Financial Services, MCKINSEY
& CO. (Sept. 10, 2020), https://www.mckinsey.com/industries/financial-services/our-insights/racialequity-in-financial-services [ https://perma.cc/6FE7-3HTD ].
217. See generally Diaz et al., supra note 216. Latinx women are the least likely to reach the top
level of an organization. Id.
218. See Boorstin, supra note 214.
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workforce” in investment banking.219 In an article focused on giving advice to
women as they begin to climb the investment-banking ladder, the head of
J.P. Morgan’s Southeast Asia M&A Practice, Ee-Ching Tay, noted that while
women make up approximately half of J.P. Morgan’s 252,000 employees, they only
comprise approximately thirty percent of senior leadership.220 She further
commented that this is not unique to J.P. Morgan, and that “no bank has enough
[senior female bankers] at the moment.” 221
A variety of reasons account for the lack of women as financial advisors in
M&A, including the “testosterone-fueled” and competitive environment in M&A
where performance of masculinities is a norm.222 Studies indicate that investment
banking’s “largely male workforce” reinforces masculine cultural norms and bias
against women in the workplace.223 Furthermore, extremely long hours and a
pressure to be seen as working long hours limits work-life balance, disadvantaging
women more than men.224 Studies have found that gender differences in career
interruptions and in the numbers of hours worked, attributed to career/family
tradeoffs that disproportionately impact women with children, are prevalent in the
business and financial sectors.225
Some articles cite the education of financial advisors as contributing to the
problem of gender disparity in the profession.226 Research indicates that among
MBA program graduates, only fourteen percent of women go into finance and

219. Tyler Gallagher, Meet the Female Leaders of Finance, AUTH. MAG. ( July 17, 2019),
https://medium.com/authority-magazine/meet-the-female-leaders-of-finance-chances-of-promotion
-come-with-performance-and-visibility-d2c6ab05b75b [ https://perma.cc/7VUA-TWA3]; see also
MERGERMARKET & TOPPAN VINTAGE, supra note 187.
220. Mortlock, supra note 25.
221. Id.
222. See Carbone et al. supra note 212, at 1111; Cahn et al., supra note 31, at 459, 465. For an
overview of masculinities theories and the construction of gender in the workplace, see Leticia
M. Saucedo, The Three Theories of Discrimination in the Brown Collar Workplace,
2009 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 345, 362–64.
223. See Terry Morehead Dworkin & Cindy A. Schipani, The Role of Gender Diversity in
Corporate Governance, 21 U. PA. J. BUS. L. 105, 118 (2018).
224. See id. at 118; Cahn et al., supra note 31, at 460. Of course, long hours, burnout, and the
struggle for balance in investment banking, both among managers and junior bankers, are not limited
to women alone. See, e.g., Sarah Kessler & Lauren Hirsch, Wall Street’s Sleepless Nights,
N.Y. TIMES: DEALBOOK (Mar. 27, 2021), https://www.nytimes.com/2021/03/27/business/
dealbook/banker-burnout.html [ https://perma.cc/5TSY-JV2H ]; Kate Kelly, Goldman Sachs Partners’
Exits Point to a Changing Culture at the Bank, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 5, 2021), https://www.nytimes.com/
2021/03/05/business/goldman-sachs-partner-exits.html [ https://perma.cc/ER6U-TK9M ].
225. See Marianne Bertrand, Claudia Goldin & Lawrence F. Katz, Dynamics of the Gender Gap
for Young Professionals in the Financial and Corporate Sector, 2 AM. ECON. J.: APPLIED ECON. 228,
230–31 (2010); see also Claudia Goldin & Lawrence F. Katz, Transitions: Career and Family Life Cycles
of the Educational Elite, 98 AM. ECON. REV. 363, 367 (2008) (finding that “negative impact of children
on women’s earnings is entirely accounted for by hours worked”).
226. In their study of MBAs who graduated from the University of Chicago’s business school
between 1990 and 2006, Bertrand, Goldin, and Katz found that men took more finance courses while
in business school. Bertrand et al., supra note 225, at 230.
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accounting, whereas twenty-three percent of men do.227 The lack of women
entering finance after MBA programs may be partly due to perceptions about the
expectations of the profession and partly about the education and modeling that
they receive while in business school. This Article’s survey of 2019–2020 course
offerings of finance, corporate finance, and mergers and acquisitions courses at the
top twenty-five business schools in the United States (as reported by the 2019
U.S. News and World Report business school rankings) found that only twenty-five
percent of the classes were taught by women faculty.228
III. DIVERSITY AND M&A: WHY DOES DIVERSITY MATTER?
Why does gender diversity among leaders in M&A dealmaking matter? The
argument for diversity in the corporate sector more broadly rests on two primary
justifications.229 The popular press accounts, and much of the business advocacy
for diversity, regularly promote the business case for diversity.230 The business or
“instrumental” case for gender diversity typically focuses on firm profitability,
group decision-making, and good corporate governance.231 Many women leaders in
M&A, however, focus more vigorously on the moral and social case for diversity,
arguing that equal opportunity and just being the “right thing to do” should be
sufficient reasons for pursuing diversity in M&A. This Section evaluates both
sets of justifications.
A. The Value of Values: Equity, Inclusion, and Access
Whether on boards, in the C-Suite, or at investment banks or law firms,
women are not provided an equal opportunity to participate in M&A and gain
positions of power.232 What the numbers show instead is that a significant portion
of the population is excluded from key decision-making roles in fundamental deals
that greatly impact companies, their shareholders and other stakeholders, and
billions of dollars trading hands. Furthermore, the barriers to inclusion involve a
large financial cost for women as well, given the financial advantages that come
with being a leader in M&A.233

227. Davies & Bansal, supra note 31.
228. Data collected by author from Survey of 2019–2020 Course Offerings of Finance,
Corporate Finance, and Mergers and Acquisitions at Top 25 U.S. Business Schools (on file with author).
229. See Rhode & Packel, supra note 10, at 382.
230. For an overview of the recent literature, see Brummer & Strine, supra note 45.
231. See Nili, supra note 10, at 160.
232. See generally Will Kymlicka & Ruth Rubio-Marin, The Participatory Turn in Gender Equality
and its Relevance for Multicultural Feminism, in GENDER PARITY AND MULTICULTURAL
FEMINISM: TOWARDS A NEW SYNTHESIS 1, 3 (Ruth Rubio-Marin & Will Kymlicka eds., 2018).
233. See McLellan, supra note 26. For example, M&A leaders in law firms are some of the most
highly compensated partners and are heavily recruited by other firms. See Stewart, supra note 128.
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Leading women in M&A often emphasize equity and access as why firms and
companies should seek to expand women’s leadership in M&A.234 Some women in
M&A even argue that it is “insulting that women would need to have a business
case for having better representation.”235 The concept of “voice” or “equal”
opportunity to have a voice often comes up in interviews with leading M&A
advisors.236 A leading M&A attorney, for example, emphasized the access to
decision-making and the value of the “power” that comes with a leadership
position.237 Importantly, these women do not claim that as M&A lawyers they speak
with one voice or approach transactions in the same way.238
Scholars have similarly emphasized equity reasons for diversity, arguing that
the business case for diversity has been “muddied” and vague, and it risks
“inflat[ing] diversity’s value.”239 Scholars argue that “building the case [for diversity]
on empirical evidence is a potentially dangerous strategy” and “must be secondary
to a normative commitment to racial justice for its own sake.”240 These scholars
emphasize the importance of acknowledging social and moral justifications for
diversity. Lisa Fairfax, for example, posits that business rationales for boardroom
diversity alone are insufficient to combat existing directors’ ingrained (albeit usually
unconscious) racial and gender biases, which constitute significant and ongoing
obstacles to the advancement of traditionally disadvantaged groups.241 Deborah
Rhode and Amanda Packel have argued that with respect to board diversity, the
instrumental or business case “is less compelling than other reasons rooted in social
justice, equal opportunity, and corporate reputation.”242 Other scholars argue that
234. See McLellan, supra note 26. Studies of board members indicate, however, that fairness
arguments were not typically cited for increasing board diversity. Lissa L. Broome,
John M. Conley & Kimberly D. Krawiec, Dangerous Categories: Narratives of Corporate Board Diversity,
89 N.C. L. REV. 759, 763 (2011).
235. MERGERMARKET & TOPPAN VINTAGE, supra note 187 at 5.
236. See Smith, Fixing Inequity, supra note 158. Critical race theorists have furthered a rich
discussion on the value of voice. See, e.g., Devon Carbado, Race to the Bottom, 49 UCLA L. REV. 1283
(2002). Furthermore, feminist corporate law scholars have recognized the value of women’s voices in
corporations and corporate law, both of which have been dominated by “economically privileged white
males” who hold much power of decision-making. Theresa A. Gabaldon, Like a Fish Needs a
Bicycle: Public Corporations and Their Shareholders, 65 MD. L. REV. 538, 546–47 (2006).
237. Hahn, supra note 137.
238. Scholars have long warned of the dangers of essentializing women’s experiences. See
generally Angela P. Harris, Race and Essentialism in Feminist Legal Theory, 42 STAN. L. REV. 581 (1990).
239. See Rosenblum, When Does Sex Diversity on Boards Benefit Firms?, supra note 10, at 429,
436–43. Professor Brummer and former Delaware Chief Justice Strine argue, however, that “in a world
of incomplete information” corporate executives and boards can derive from the various studies done
that “a business case for Diversity is present.” Brummer & Strine, supra note 45, at 30–31. Other
scholars argue that business rationales can be an effective way to garner support for diversity in the
corporation. See, e.g., Donald C. Langevoort, Overcoming Resistance to Diversity in the Executive
Suite: Grease, Grit, and the Corporate Promotion Tournament, 61 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1615,
1643 (2004).
240. Thomas W. Joo, Race, Corporate Law, and Shareholder Value, 54 J. LEGAL EDUC. 351,
359 (2004).
241. See Fairfax, Board Diversity Revisited, supra note 10, at 883–84.
242. Rhode & Packel, supra note 10, at 379.
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the business case for diversity “may not be a persuasive rationale when attempting
to engender broad support for inclusion and encourage equitable behavior among
decision makers in organizations.”243
In addition to equity reasons focused on the individual level, a culture of equal
opportunity also benefits firms. Research indicates that “[o]bstacles to women’s
success also decrease employees’ morale, commitment, and retention, and increase
the expenses associated with recruiting, training, and mentoring replacements.”244
While the social and moral case for diversity is particularly compelling,
especially for M&A where women have long been excluded and marginalized, there
may also be value in the instrumental case for diversity for M&A deals specifically.
Section B below turns to these instrumental arguments.
B. Improving the M&A Decision-Making Process
In addition to the social and moral justifications for women’s leadership in
M&A, companies themselves as well as many advocates for gender and racial
diversity frequently rely on the instrumental or business case for diversity and
inclusion.245 Many scholars have cast doubt on the strength of the business case for
diversity, at least when it comes to measurable empirical results such as financial
performance.246 Nevertheless, for M&A transactions which involve a plethora of
complex decisions, the instrumental case focusing on group dynamics,
decision-making, and risk management has appeal.247
M&A transactions are often the most impactful decision that a corporation
can undertake. While a good transaction can greatly enhance the value and strategic
direction of a company, “a bad deal—whether the failure is rooted in the concept
[i.e., the ‘logic of the deal,’ that is, the business justification for the proposed
acquisition], the price, or the execution—is probably the fastest legal means of
destroying [the company’s] value.”248
Research indicates that M&A deals are often tainted by agency problems and
behavior biases. Executives are incentivized to undertake M&A deals that will
243. Jamillah Bowman Williams, Breaking Down Bias: Legal Mandates vs. Corporate Interests, 92
WASH. L. REV. 1473, 1513 (2017).
244. RHODE, supra note 45, at 3.
245. Scholars have criticized the use of diversity as corporate strategy. See Shin & Gulati, supra
note 44, at 1053.
246. See Rhode & Packel, supra note 10, at 387–90; Brummer & Strine, supra note 45
(manuscript at 28–30). Some scholars have found that the business case for diversity may hamper
inclusion. In an experimental study, Professor Williams found that “exposure to the business case led
to more negative beliefs about inclusion and more biased behavior than a legal rationale.” Williams,
supra note 243, at 1502.
247. For an overview of the literature on how diversity can impact decision-making and reduce
risk, see Brummer & Strine, supra note 45 (manuscript at 31–36). For an analysis of how addressing
power differentials can affect corporate culture, promote diversity, and lower risk, see generally Miazad,
supra note 7.
248. Smith, supra note 36, at 48–49; see also Balls, supra note 36; Christofferson et al., supra
note 36.
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benefit themselves personally at the expense of the corporation.249 Relatedly,
prevalent cognitive and behavioral biases, such as hubris and overconfidence, often
lead to value-destroying M&A deals pushed by executives and advisors.250 Studies
have found that executives may be overconfident about the value of a deal, and
driven by their desire to win, they may be overoptimistic about their ability to
successfully integrate two companies together.251 Executive decision-making in
M&A has also been found to be tainted by other factors, such as extensive social
ties between managers of bidders and targets or a desire to keep up with peers
undertaking acquisitions.252 Furthermore, research suggests that traits such as
hubris, overconfidence, or narcissism often mask for leadership skills.253 In fact,
studies find that overconfident executives have a higher likelihood than rational
managers of being promoted to the CEO,254 despite a lack of
leadership effectiveness.255
With the strong incentives for CEOs and advisors to push forward on M&A
deals,256 M&A dealmaking can suffer the dangers of “groupthink,” where the drive
249. See Afsharipour & Laster, supra note 12, at 447, 470–73.
250. For a comprehensive listing and discussion of managerial biases in M&A, see generally Sanjay
Dhir & Amita Mital, Decision-Making for Mergers and Acquisitions: The Role of Agency Issues and
Behavioral Biases, 21 STRATEGIC CHANGE 59 (2012).
251. See James A. Fanto, Quasi-Rationality in Action: A Study of Psychological Factors in Merger
Decision-Making, 62 OHIO ST. L.J. 1333, 1354–57, 1372–74 (2001); see also, e.g., Vicki Bogan & David
Just, What Drives Merger Decision Making Behavior? Don’t Seek, Don’t Find, and Don’t Change Your
Mind, 72 J. ECON. BEHAV. & ORG. 930, 932 (2009) (noting that confirmation bias, “a situation in which
an individual attaches too much importance to information that supports his views,” impacts merger
decisions); Deepak Malhotra, The Desire to Win: The Effects of Competitive Arousal on Motivation and
Behavior, 111 ORGANIZATIONAL BEHAV. & HUM. DECISION PROCESSES 139, 139 (2010) (examining
“when and why potentially self-damaging competitive motivations and behaviors will emerge”); Deepak
Malhotra, Gillian Ku & J. Keith Murnighan, When Winning Is Everything, HARV. BUS. REV. (2008),
https://hbr.org/2008/05/when-winning-is-everything [ https://perma.cc/LA9X-NPT6 ] (identifying
“three principal drivers of competitive arousal in business settings: rivalry, time pressure, and
audience scrutiny”).
252. For an overview of this literature, see generally Afsharipour, supra note 11, at 477–79.
253. See Tomas Chamorro-Premuzic, Why Do So Many Incompetent Men Become Leaders?,
HARV. BUS. REV. (Aug. 22, 2013), https://hbr.org/2013/08/why-do-so-many-incompetent-men
[ https://perma.cc/KCM6-87CB ]. Gender theorists often designate these traits as “toxic masculinity.”
See Berdahl et al., supra note 163, at 423.
254. See Anand M. Goel & Anjan V. Thakor, Overconfidence, CEO Selection, and Corporate
Governance, 63 J. FIN. 2737 (2008).
255. See Tomas Chamorro-Premuzic & Cindy Gallop, 7 Leadership Lessons Men Can Learn
from Women, HARV. BUS. REV. (Apr. 1, 2020), https://hbr.org/2020/04/7-leadership-lessons-mencan-learn-from-women [ https://perma.cc/Q9KM-NVTA ]; Jack Zenger & Joseph Folkman,
Research: Women Score Higher than Men in Most Leadership Skills, HARV. BUS. REV. ( June 25, 2019),
https://hbr.org/2019/06/research-women-score-higher-than-men-in-most-leadership-skills [ https://
perma.cc/WLB3-Z625 ]. For an overview of the literature on leadership style and gender, see Alice
H. Eagly, Women as Leaders: Leadership Style vs. Leaders’ Values and Attitudes,
HARV. BUS. SCH. RSCH. SYMP., GENDER & WORK: CHALLENGING CONVENTIONAL WISDOM (2013),
http://www.hbs.edu/faculty/conferences/2013-w50-research-symposium/Documents/eagly.pdf
[ https://perma.cc/S6P7-6KMN ].
256. For a detailed discussion of these incentives, see Afsharipour & Laster, supra note 12, at
453–58 (on management incentives); id. at 474–77 (on incentives of advisors).
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to move forward on a deal and acquiescence to the wishes of a CEO are strong.257
Directors as well as advisors are often susceptible to groupthink and to the biases
of executives. “[U]nder the influence of an autocratic CEO/Chairman” or the
pressure of advisors and corporate executives, “board members either succumb to
apathy, and simply go through the motions, or hubris can come to define their
collective decision-making such that members believe every decision they make as
a group will indubitably foster positive results.”258
1. Improving Decision-Making
Research in management and social psychology suggest that gender and racial
diversity could lead to better decision-making processes in M&A transactions.259
Experts argue that homogenous groups are more prone to high levels of
cohesiveness, frustrating the process of meaningful and critical discussion.260
Cohesive homogenous groups can succumb to groupthink and be less likely to
individually analyze or question the decisions that they are asked to make. Moreover,
as seen in many corporate environments,261 homogeneous firms can suffer from
“masculinity contest cultures” which “make winning at all cost the test of success,
and tolerate self-interested, unethical, and counterproductive behavior.”262 These
cultures both punish women and push them out of leadership roles, presenting
women with what scholars Carbone, Cahn, and Levit describe as a “triple bind.” In
other words,
women lose if they do not play by the same terms as the men, lose if they
do try to play on the same terms by being disproportionately punished for

257. Groupthink is a type of “in-group bias” more common in homogeneous groups and results
in dysfunctional decision-making outcomes. See Sharpe, supra note 13, at 1435, 1450.
258. Brummer & Strine, supra note 45 (manuscript at 33).
259. See Lynne L. Dallas, The New Managerialism and Diversity on Corporate Boards of Directors,
76 TUL. L. REV. 1363, 1391 (2002) (explaining that diversity generates “conflicting opinions, knowledge,
and perspectives that result in a more thorough consideration of interpretations, alternatives, and
consequences”); SCOTT E. PAGE, THE DIFFERENCE: HOW THE POWER OF DIVERSITY CREATES
BETTER GROUPS, FIRMS, SCHOOLS AND SOCIETIES 324–35 (2007); Frank Dobbin & Jiwook Jung,
Corporate Board Gender Diversity and Stock Performance: The Competence Gap or Institutional Investor
Bias?, 89 N.C. L. REV. 809, 814–15 (2010).
260. See Daniel P. Forbes & Frances J. Milliken, Cognition and Corporate
Governance: Understanding Boards of Directors as Strategic Decision-Making Groups, 24 ACAD. MGMT.
REV. 489, 492–96 (1999). “Cohesiveness” is defined as “the degree to which board members are
attracted to each other and are motivated to stay on the board.” Id. at 493. Some studies have found,
however, that diversity may reduce group cohesion, resulting in more difficult decision-making and
greater dissatisfaction. For a discussion, see Dobbin & Jung, supra note 259, at 815–17.
261. See, e.g., Benjamin P. Edwards & Ann C. McGinley, Venture Bearding,
52 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1873, 1891–96 (2019) (discussing how “masculinity contest cultures” drive out
women in Silicon Valley).
262. June Carbone & William K. Black, The Problem with Predators, 43 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 441,
478 (2020). Studies find that lack of diversity is often associated with negative workplace environments.
See Berdahl et al., supra note 163, at 422; Kenneth Matos, Olivia (Mandy) O’Neill & Xue Lei, Toxic
Leadership and the Masculinity Contest Culture: How “Win or Die” Cultures Breed Abusive Leadership,
74 J. SOC. ISSUES 500, 502–03 (2018).
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displaying the self-centered, rule-breaking behavior of the men, and over
time become less likely to apply for such positions and thus more likely,
individually and as a group, to be perceived as lacking what it takes to
succeed in such environments.263
More diverse decision-making groups benefit from a healthy level of
“cognitive conflict” and are more likely to hold different opinions about how to
characterize and address issues that arise.264 The presence of these differing
opinions leads to more critical discussion and consideration of more alternatives,
thus positively contributing to the overall decision-making process.265 For example,
in a 2014 article, Joan Heminway merges both trait-based and psychology-based
interpretations when assessing the effect of female directors on corporate
performance.266 Specifically, Heminway argues that female traits influence the three
conditions to the social psychology concept of “crowd wisdom”: diversity,
independence, and “a particular kind of decentralization.”267
Diversity may also encourage better problem-solving as those with different
life experiences, such as women and people of color, may approach an analysis of a
problem from a different perspective or lens. While women and people of color do
not speak with one voice,268 greater aggregate diversity allows for different voices
and perspectives to be heard when solving problems.269 Advocates for gender
diversity on boards argue, for example, women’s life experiences differ significantly
from those of men and provide the board with a wider range of knowledge,
concerns, questions, and perspectives from which to discuss decisions.
Furthermore, “[m]en’s and women’s differing knowledge and experience can affect
how they seek and evaluate information, which affects their decision-making

263. Carbone et al., supra note 212, at 1126–27.
264. “Cognitive conflict refers to task-oriented differences in judgment among group
members” and “is concerned with the presence of issue-related disagreement among members.” Forbes
& Milliken, supra note 260, at 494; see also Janet Sniezek & Rebecca A. Henry, Accuracy and Confidence
in Group Judgment, 43 ORGANIZATIONAL BEHAV. & HUM. DECISION PROCESSES 1, 20 (1989) (“The
more disagreements that group members reported, the more accurate were their group judgments.”);
David Rock & Heidi Grant, Why Diverse Teams Are Smarter, HARV. BUS. REV. (Nov. 4, 2016),
https://hbr.org/2016/11/why-diverse-teams-are-smarter [ https://perma.cc/7S44-529D ].
265. See Forbes & Milliken, supra note 260, at 494; Alison Reynolds & David Lewis, Teams Solve
Problems Faster When They’re More Cognitively Diverse, HARV. BUS. REV. (Mar. 30, 2017),
https://hbr.org/2017/03/teams-solve-problems-faster-when-theyre-more-cognitively-diverse [ https://
perma.cc/74KE-YR32 ].
266. Heminway, supra note 10, at 61 (“[ T]his article describes theories of the crowd from social
psychology and applies them to the literature on female corporate directors, looking at the effects on
both women as crowd members and boards as decision-making crowds.”).
267. Id. at 68.
268. Many scholars have rejected the notion that there is “a unitary, ‘essential’ women’s
experience [ that ] can be isolated and described independently of race, class, sexual orientations, and
other realities of experience.” Harris, supra note 238, at 585.
269. For a discussion of how different voices can provide different perspectives in
decision-making, see Kevin R. Johnson & Luis Fuentes-Rohwer, A Principled Approach to the Quest for
Racial Diversity on the Judiciary, 10 MICH. J. RACE & L. 5, 11–22 (2004).
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processes and collective intelligence.”270 And because there is no singular woman’s
voice, a critical mass of women, including women of color, is needed to bring to the
fore the diversity of perspectives that can help enrich decision-making.271
For large firms, diversity is also valuable because it “requires greater
cooperation and trust,” which in turn need “institutionalization,”
“procedural regularity,” and transparency—all elements that can help
improve decision-making.272
Research suggests that diversity pays off particularly for complex decisions
that involve problem-solving and prediction—in other words, exactly the type of
decision-making undertaken in M&A deals.273 Having more women involved in
fundamental corporate decisions could lead to less groupthink, more efficient
decision-making, and perhaps better performance of M&A transactions.274 It may
be that higher levels of participation in M&A decision-making by women can affect
the dynamics of M&A transactions in several ways. For example, the due diligence
process that is central to a deal could be more thorough and comprehensive, with
women advisors providing additional information to boards to address the risks of
a transaction more fully.275 The presence of women as leaders may also impact
deliberations about whether to move forward on a deal because of higher
monitoring of and strategic guidance provided to executives in connection
with a deal.276
2. Diversity and M&A: Implications from Empirical Studies
Over the past two decades, there has been a proliferation of empirical research
and case studies investigating the effects of diversity on decision-making and
performance in M&A transactions.277 This literature has primarily focused on board

270.
271.

RHODE, supra note 45, at 4.
On tokenism and marginalization, see ROSABETH MOSS KANTER, THE PROBLEMS OF
TOKENISM 39 (1974). On the dangers of tokenism on corporate boards, see Afra Afsharipour, The One
Woman Director Mandate: History and Trajectory, in CORPORATE GOVERNANCE IN INDIA: CHANGE
AND CONTINUITY 99–101 (Asish K. Bhattacharyya ed. 2016); Joan Macleod Heminway & Sarah White,
Wanted: Female Corporate Directors, 29 PACE L. REV. 249, 257–64 (2009). On the application of critical
mass theory generally, and with respect to boards, see Lissa Lamkin Broome,
John M. Conley & Kimberly D. Krawiec, Does Critical Mass Matter? Views from the Boardroom, 34
SEATTLE U. L. REV. 1049, 1052–56 (2011).
272. Carbone & Black, supra note 262, at 495.
273. See SCOTT E. PAGE, THE DIVERSITY BONUS: HOW GREAT TEAMS PAY OFF IN THE
KNOWLEDGE ECONOMY 24 (2017) (“Many of our complex challenges involve understanding the
actions, preferences, and capabilities of diverse people. Thus, identity diversity also contributes relevant
cognitive diversity.”); see also PAGE, supra note 259, at 324–26.
274. See Marleen A. O’Connor, The Enron Board: The Perils of Groupthink,
71 U. CIN. L. REV. 1233, 1306–08 (2003); Rosenblum, When Does Sex Diversity on Boards Benefit
Firms?, supra note 10, at 458–460.
275. See DHIR, supra note 10, at 124–26.
276. Id. at 125–26.
277. See Anzhela Knyazeva, Diana Knyazeva & Lalitha Naveen, Diversity on Corporate Boards,
13 ANN. REV. OF FIN. ECON. 301, 305-06 (2021).
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composition.278 Among the board composition scholarship is an abundance of
literature evaluating the implications of director diversity, particularly gender
diversity. For example, studies suggest that increased female board representation
is associated with more vigorous board monitoring. A study by Adams and Ferreira
is illustrative of gender diversity’s association with more vigorous board
monitoring.279 They find evidence that women board members are more likely to
have better attendance records and sit on “monitoring-related” committees (e.g.,
audit, nominating, corporate governance).280 They also find that boards with greater
gender diversity were more likely to hold CEOs accountable for poor stock
price performance.281
Other studies suggest that increased gender diversity on boards is associated
with less overpayment in acquisitions and with fewer acquisitions overall.282 For
example, a 2014 study by Levi, Li, and Zhang examines the impact of director
gender on M&A activity, finding a negative association between the fraction of a
firm’s women directors and both the number of acquisition bids and the average
size of bid premiums.283 The authors theorize that their evidence is consistent with
women on bidder boards having “lower overconfidence in the precision of their
estimates of an acquisition and/or in the expected value of an acquisition.”284 The
authors argue that these results further support the importance of board diversity
in acquisition decisions.285 Furthermore, related research finds that gender diversity
on boards helps temper the overconfidence of male CEOs.286
A 2016 study by Chen, Crossland, and Huang also addresses gender diversity
in the M&A context by examining the effect of female board representation on
corporate acquisition intensity.287 Similar to the 2014 Levi study, they find that
greater female board representation was negatively associated with both overall firm
acquisitiveness and target acquisition size.288 Developing an explanation borrowed

278. Id.
279. Renée B. Adams & Daniel Ferreira, Women in the Boardroom and Their Impact on
Governance and Performance, 94 J. FIN. ECON. 291, 291 (2009).
280. Id. at 296–301.
281. Id. at 301.
282. See Maurice Levi, Kai Li & Feng Zhang, Director Gender and Mergers and Acquisitions, 28
J. CORP. FIN. 185, 185–86 (2014); see also Guoli Chen, Craig Crossland & Sterling Huang, Female Board
Representation and Corporate Acquisition Intensity, 37 STRATEGIC MGMT. J. 303, 303–05 (2016).
283. See Levi et al., supra note 282, at 185.
284. Id. at 186. A related study finds that male CEOs at firms with women directors exhibit
less overconfidence. See Jie Chen, Woon Sau Leung, Wei Song & Marc Goergen, Why Female Board
Representation Matters: The Role of Female Directors in Reducing Male CEO Overconfidence,
53 J. EMPIRICAL FIN. 70, 71 (2019).
285. See Levi et al., supra note 282, at 185.
286. Jie Chen, Woon Sau Leung, Wei Song & Marc Goergen, Research: When Women Are on
Boards, Male CEOS Are Less Overconfident, HARV. BUS. REV. (Sept. 12, 2019), https://hbr.org/
2019/09/research-when-women-are-on-boards-male-ceos-are-less-overconfident [ https://perma.cc/
9TM3-UPFK].
287. See Chen et al., supra note 282, at 303–05.
288. Id.

Clean Final Edit_Afsharipour_v2 (ET editrs).docx (Do Not Delete)

2022 ]

WOMEN AND M&A

1/31/2022 10:48 AM

405

from social psychology called “social identity theory,” they posit that “the presence
of multiple salient categories [e.g., gender] within a board will be associated with
more competitive interactions, decision-making processes are likely to be more
contentious, thorough, and comprehensive, and less likely to be categorized by
acquiescence, rapid consensus, or groupthink.”289
Studies have also begun to address gender diversity and the C-Suite. Like the
research on board diversity and M&A, the research on executive diversity and M&A
also suggests that women executives approach M&A transactions differently from
male executives.290 One of the leading studies on this issue is a 2013 study by Huang
and Kisgen, which examines the presence of female executives on the buy-side and
investigates the effect of the executive’s gender on acquirer returns for a sample of
large publicly listed firms in which male executives were replaced by female ones.291
Huang and Kisgen find that male executives undertake more acquisitions and issue
debt more often than female executives.292 With respect to acquirer announcement
returns, the study finds that returns are two percent higher for deals conducted by
female executives relative to the ones led by male executives.293 Huang and Kisgen
posit that there is some evidence that male executives are more likely to seek
empire-building and suffer from overconfidence, which results in more
value-destroying acquisitions.294
Given the absence of systematic data on diversity among M&A advisors,
empirical studies have yet to explore the relationship between diversity of M&A
advisors and transaction outcomes or decision-making.
IV. TOWARDS WOMEN’S INCLUSION IN M&A
Diversity matters for M&A; it matters for moral and social reasons, and it
matters for instrumental reasons. The data discussed in this Article shows that
women’s underrepresentation and slow progress in leadership roles in M&A
dealmaking is still far from fully understood. Furthermore, research on women and
leadership indicates that solutions that have succeeded in moving toward greater
gender diversity on boards—including shareholder advocacy, disclosure, and
quotas—are only a few of the many tools necessary to transform M&A practice.

289. Id. at 305.
290. See Jiekun Huang & Darren J. Kisgen, Gender and Corporate Finance: Are Male Executives
Overconfident Relative to Female Executives?, 108 J. FIN. ECON. 822, 822–23 (2013); see also Ralph Estes
& Jinoos Hosseini, The Gender Gap on Wall Street: An Empirical Analysis of Confidence in Investment
Decision Making, 122 J. PSYCH. 577, 577 (1988) (finding that women exhibit less confidence in
investment decision-making than men); Alicia R. Ingersoll, Christy Glass, Alison Cook & Kari Joseph
Olsen, Power, Status and Expectations: How Narcissism Manifests Among Women CEOs,
158 J. BUS. ETHICS 893, 893 (2019) (finding that women CEOs are less likely to exhibit narcissistic
personality traits compared to men CEOs).
291. See Huang & Kisgen, supra note 290, at 822.
292. See id. at 829.
293. See id. at 831–32.
294. See id. at 835.
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This Part discusses the various tools that may be useful for advancing diversity
in leadership ranks in M&A. In evaluating and deploying these tools, disclosure and
transparency regarding each institutional actor involved M&A are critical. As the
discussion in Parts I and II shows, while there is substantial disclosure and
information about some institutions, such as the board, there is significantly less
information on leadership, incentives, and the ground problems for other actors,
including executives, legal advisors, and especially financial advisors. Furthermore,
the disparities examined in Parts I and II of this Article—few women as leaders in
M&A transactions—focus on the outcome of long-percolating problems, but these
outcomes tell us little about specific barriers in each institution. Studies show that
for institutions where there has been greater disclosure and transparency, such as
boards, stakeholders have been able to mobilize both to pressure firms and to
provide solutions for achieving greater diversity. But at other end of the
spectrum—for example financial advisors—advocacy and strong normative
recommendations are significantly more challenging because diversity disparities
and the reasons for such disparities are less well studied and well understood.
Nevertheless, some of the existing data does suggest that pipeline issues are a
challenge for the C-Suite, law firms, and financial advisors in M&A. However,
without further understanding of disparities in each of these institutions, it is
unlikely that solutions to impact the path to leadership can be transplanted from
one institution to another.
A. Disclosure and Transparency
Institutions value what they measure, and they measure what they value. For
M&A dealmaking, data regarding leadership has thus far remained unmeasured and
undisclosed. Instead, companies and firms often provide broad and unquantifiable
information regarding their commitment to diversity generally without making
substantial progress. Yet, disclosure and transparency are critical to understanding
gender disparities, and associated barriers and incentives. Without accurate diversity
data, stakeholders have limited opportunity to pressure M&A leaders to invest in
fostering diversity among their leaders, and firms have fewer incentives to prioritize
the inclusion that the literature shows may benefit them.295 Moreover, disclosure
and transparency can better allow collaboration among leaders in M&A to advance
the leadership of women in M&A.
Disclosure and transparency have been critical for efforts to impact board
diversity. Both research from academia and industry have highlighted and examined
gender diversity among board members. Transparency in disclosure regarding board
makeup has facilitated efforts by a variety of stakeholders to hold boards
accountable and to place greater pressure on boards to diversify. Furthermore, as
Jamillah Bowman Williams has argued, transparent diversity data would incentivize
295. See Williams, supra note 9, at 1723; see also Alexander M. Nourafshan, From the Closet to
the Boardroom: Regulating LGBT Diversity on Corporate Boards, 81 ALB. L. REV. 439, 481 (2017).
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companies to pursue “effective” diversity initiatives as a variety of stakeholders
could use this information to further diversity goals.296
Disclosure and transparency remain low for many of the actors involved in
M&A. While greater information and metrics about diversity in the C-Suite have
emerged over the past few years, there is little systematic data on a per-company
basis.297 For example, since 2015, McKinsey and LeanIn have issued a Women in the
Workplace report with data on women’s leadership at 317 companies, yet much of
this literature focuses on only the largest firms (i.e., the Fortune 500) and there is
little company-specific data. Furthermore, gender disparities extend beyond the
C-Suite to other senior executive positions.298 However, there is little data on
women’s leadership in roles that lead to the C-Suite although news stories suggest
that women are often sidelined from executive roles that can lead to the CEO or
CFO positions.299
Similarly, ABA studies on women in law firms present an important overall
picture of women’s leadership in firms. Yet, there is little practice-group- or
firm-specific information in many of these studies. While some firms disclose the
number of women partners at the firm, few differentiate between equity partners
and non-equity partners, and even fewer provide information on partner leadership
in various practice groups.300 For the financial services industry, the lack of
disclosure or transparency is even more substantial. Not only do leading investment
banks fail to provide any systematic data on leaders, but many resist efforts to
provide greater transparency with respect to their diversity data.301
Disclosure and transparency also can facilitate stronger collaboration among
leaders in M&A to advance the leadership of women in M&A. Following the
formation of the ABA’s Women in M&A Taskforce, in 2017, a number of
prominent women M&A leaders launched the Women in M&A Network to “seek
to advance the success and leadership of women in the field of M&A across the
legal, banking, in-house, business development, and boardroom functions.”302 The
broadening of accurate data about M&A data could incentivize groups such as these

296. See generally Ann Lipton, Not Everything Is About Investors: The Case for Mandatory
Stakeholder Disclosure, 37 YALE J. ON REG. 499 (2020) (arguing for the explicit acknowledgement of
the importance of disclosure for stakeholders beyond shareholders).
297. See Martinez & Fletcher, supra note 4, at 888–89.
298. See WOMEN IN THE WORKPLACE 2020, supra note 17, at 58.
299. See Fuhrmans, supra note 47.
300. Large law firms also typically lack transparency with respect to compensation decisions.
See Lee, supra note 132, at 599–600.
301. Even outside of the financial services industry, firms resist disclosing diversity data so as
to hide gender and racial disparities. See generally Williams, supra note 9.
302. New York Women in M&A Network Dinner, SULLIVAN & CROMWELL (Nov. 29, 2017),
https://www.sullcrom.com/events-new-york-women-in-manda-network-dinner-2017 [ https://perma.cc/
3WZN-YFMU ].
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to learn from each other about the strategies to retain and promote women and to
address structural barriers that hinder women’s rise to leadership.303
For example, interviews with women leaders in M&A highlight the importance
of flexibility. How to address this need for flexibility is a structural issue that may
need leaders across firms to collaborate on solutions, especially for a field that is
seen as requiring longer, unexpected hours, which can hinder the ability to attend
to family responsibilities and maintain a personal life.304 While there has been a shift
in child-rearing responsibilities, women are still often the primary caretakers.
Women’s family responsibilities are often seen as impacting their ability to move up
through the ranks of M&A advisory work. As Mary Anne Citrino, former Senior
Managing Director at Blackstone said, “[i]t’s hard to get through the years when you
are raising children—when you get a phone call, ‘get on a plane in two hours’ and
oh well, it’s my six-year-old’s birthday party . . . [g]uys can get away with that
somehow.”305 Similarly, many women lawyers express that M&A practice needs to
develop greater flexibility to support women’s rise to leadership.306
B. Attacking Bias
Corporations and firms have spent decades espousing their commitment to
gender equality, yet progress has lagged.307 To some extent, “bias in favor of
preserving the status quo” plays a role in undermining the advancement of
diverse leaders.308
Like many women professionals and leaders, women executives, attorneys,
and financial advisors often remark on the significant bias that they experience in
negotiations, in interacting with clients, and in their workplaces.309 For most M&A
transactions, women do not make up a critical mass of principals or advisors on a

303. See, e.g., Lizzy McLellan, The Women in the Room, AM. LAW., Apr. 2017, at 44 (discussing
the need for creating more flexible deal structures to facilitate lawyers to stay on top of deals while
attending to family responsibilities).
304. See generally Frankle et al., supra note 25.
305. Davies & Bansal, supra note 31.
306. McLellan, supra note 303.
307. For a discussion of the research exploring the reasons for shortcomings in corporate
diversity efforts, see Martinez & Fletcher, supra note 4, at 885–88.
308. Stefanie K. Johnson, David R. Hekman & Elsa T. Chan, If There’s Only One Woman in
Your Candidate Pool, There’s Statistically No Chance She’ll Be Hired, HARV. BUS. REV. (Apr. 26, 2016),
https://hbr.org/2016/04/if-theres-only-one-woman-in-your-candidate-pool-theres-statistically-nochance-shell-be-hired [ https://perma.cc/QP9W-DEXD ].
309. See Elisabeth Kelan, Why Aren’t We Making More Progress Towards Gender Equity,
HARV. BUS. REV. (Dec. 21, 2020), https://hbr.org/2020/12/why-arent-we-making-more-progresstowards-gender-equity [ https://perma.cc/LN2W-KG6U ] (examining the role of “gender fatigue,”
which is “the phenomenon of simultaneously acknowledging that gender inequality exists in general
while denying that it exists in one’s immediate work environment,” in perpetuating the gender career
gap in organizations); RHODE, supra note 45, at 57–64, 79–83.
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deal and are hampered by gender norms.310 Furthermore, with few women in
leadership roles in M&A, women have few role models to help them navigate the
complex dynamics of M&A negotiations.
While women’s representation in leadership has increased, women executives
frequently report significant implicit and explicit biases in the workplace.311 Women
leaders across industries often report a variety of aggressions from being talked over
and repeatedly interrupted to being “mansplained.”312 An unidentified Business
Development Director at a Fortune 100 company described her experiences as she
moved up the ranks:
[A] bias against a woman negotiator is probably something that most
women in a deal environment could relate to . . . “[w]hen you are the only
woman at the table, it’s very common that others may interrupt, finish your
sentence, or not give you subtle encouragement to continue. So, you have
to ‘take command of a room’ to establish yourself as the deal lead,
something that a man might be given naturally.”313
Even when women do rise to leadership ranks, it has been hard to be
recognized as leaders. In a 2011 article, the authors described the makeup of
speakers at “nearly every private equity, M&A or investment banking conference”
as majority men in crisp, gray suits.314 While this trend remains, a quick survey of
recent conferences shows there has been some improvement. For example, at the
Practising Law Institute 2017 M&A conference, seven of the twenty-five speakers
were women.315 This group included Jennifer Muller, then chair of the ABA Women
in M&A Task Force and the Honorable Tamika Montgomery-Reeves, then a
Vice-Chancellor of the Delaware Chancery Court.316 While seven of twenty-five
speakers, which represents twenty-eight percent, is certainly not an end goal, it is an
improvement over prior conferences where speakers had been primarily white men.
Firms have long used trainings to attack bias in various professions, yet
research shows that the “positive effects of diversity training rarely last beyond a
day or two” and may even “activate bias or spark a backlash.”317 To attack such
310. See Smith, supra note 158. For a discussion on the importance of critical mass, see Vicki
W. Kramer, Alison M. Konrad & Sumru Erkut, Critical Mass on Corporate Boards: Why Three or More
Women Enhance Governance 8–9 (Wellesley Ctrs. For Women, Working Paper No. 11, 2006).
311. Despite persistent reports of harassment and gender bias in the workplace, studies indicate
that many boards fail to address or even discuss sexism in the workplace. See Tom C.W. Lin, Executive
Private Misconduct, 88 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 327, 382 (2020).
312. See generally Adam Grant, Who Won’t Shut Up in Meetings? Men Say It’s Women. It’s Not.,
WASH. POST (Feb. 18, 2021, 6:00 AM), https://www.washingtonpost.com/outlook/2021/02/18/
men-interrupt-women-tokyo-olympics/ [ https://perma.cc/5F8Y-E8C9 ]; Smith, supra note 158.
313. Terrarosa & Keitz, supra note 119, at 7.
314. Davies & Bansal, supra note 31.
315. See Speaker Bio, Mergers and Acquisitions 2017: Advanced Trends and Developments, PLI
PLUS ( Jan. 12, 2017), https://plus.pli.edu/Browse/Title?rows=10&fq=~2B~title_id~3A282B~1806
51~29~&facet=true&qt=legal_boolean#authorbio [ https://perma.cc/4ZVR-JE4C ].
316. Id.
317. Frank Dobbin & Alexandra Kalev, Why Diversity Programs Fail, HARV. BUS. REV.,
July–Aug. 2016, at 52[ ; see also Williams, supra note 243, at 1512–13.
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biases, firms need to not only implement bias reduction training but to do so in a
way that addresses institutional structures and impacts gatekeepers.318 Anti-bias and
diversity efforts need to be designed in ways that have proven effective, including
engaging leaders and holding those in positions of power accountable for their
performance on these matters.319 Furthermore, disclosure and transparency are
necessary components for attacking bias in M&A.
Research indicates that mentoring programs are particularly effective in
reducing bias.320 Many firms have launched various women’s initiatives or affinity
groups to promote diversity, but their efficacy and impact are unclear.321 Instead,
experts suggest engaging leaders and managers broadly in mentoring programs.322
C. Stakeholder Pressure
1. Stakeholder Pressure for Board Diversity
Stakeholder advocacy has played a key role in board diversity efforts. Professor
Lisa Fairfax’s examination of stakeholder advocacy reveals the multi-pronged
efforts of influential shareholders to advance board diversity through statements,
diversity engagement with companies, shareholder voting campaigns for board
elections, and shareholder proposals.323 The largest asset managers, including
BlackRock, State Street, and Vanguard, have all engaged public companies in board
diversity efforts.324 For example, in 2018, BlackRock, the world’s largest asset
manager with over $6.3 trillion under management, stated that the companies in
which it invests should have at least two female directors. Furthermore, BlackRock
then asked about 300 companies in the Russell 1000 with fewer than two women
directors to disclose their approaches to diversity and to establish a timeframe for
improvement.325 Studies have found that the campaign by the largest three
institutional investors had a large impact on gender diversity on boards.326

318. RHODE, supra note 45, at 90–91.
319. See Alexandra Kalev, Frank Dobbin & Erin Kelly, Best Practices or Best Guesses? Assessing
the Efficacy of Corporate Affirmative Action and Diversity Policies, 71 AM. SOCIO. REV. 589, 591–95
(2006); Dobbin & Kalev, supra note 199, at 293–94.
320. See Dobbin & Kalev, supra note 317.
321. See Kalev et al., supra note 319, at 590; PEERY, supra note 156, at 14. Research has found
that affinity groups rarely involve those in top managerial positions. See generally Frank Dobbin, Soohan
Kim & Alexandra Kalev, You Can’t Always Get What You Need: Organizational Determinants of
Diversity Programs, 76 AM. SOCIO. REV. 386, 388 (2011).
322. See Dobbin & Kalev, supra note 317.
323. See Fairfax, All on Board?, supra note 10, at 1040–51.
324. See BLACKROCK, PROXY VOTING GUIDELINES FOR U.S. SECURITIES (2019); Cydney
Posner, BlackRock Advocates That at Least Two Women Be on Each Company Board, COOLEY PUBCO
(Feb. 6, 2018), https://cooleypubco.com/2018/02/06/blackrock-advocates-that-at-least-two-womenbe-on-each-company-board/ [ https://perma.cc/9HGU-8BM5 ].
325. See Posner, supra note 324.
326. See, e.g., Gormley et al., supra note 84, at 3 (finding that “The Big Three’s campaigns led
firms to add 2.5 times as many female directors in 2019 as they had in 2016, accounting for at least
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Other important investors have recently updated their voting policies to reflect
an increasing focus on diversity in their portfolio companies’ top ranks. For
example, the California Public Employee’s Retirement System (CalPERS), one of
the country’s largest public pension funds, has a policy which focuses on board
diversity.327 Furthermore, CalPERS has committed to withholding votes from
directors at companies that inadequately respond to board diversity engagement and
to voting in support of shareholder proposals related to diversity.328 CalPERS has
also paired with other major pension funds to develop an online database of diverse
executive-level candidates for companies to use in their recruitment strategies for
board membership.329
2. Stakeholder Pressure for C-Suite Diversity
The multi-pronged efforts on board diversity have increased significantly since
2017, resulting in substantial changes in overall board composition. Critics have
argued, however, that board diversity efforts have “serve[d] as a smokescreen to
conceal just how white [and male] a company’s leaders (the CEO and his team)
are.”330 For boards, many have responded to diversity advocacy by increasing the
size of the board. Increasing the size of the C-Suite or splitting up coveted C-Suite
positions of power, however, would face considerable opposition and practical
difficulties at most companies.331 Furthermore, even the success of board diversity
efforts has been considerably less promising at companies beyond the
Fortune 500.332
Nonetheless, stakeholder pressure on diversity beyond the board to the
C-Suite is emerging, although the path to gender parity is significantly more
complex than the path to board diversity.333 A variety of investors and investor
three-fourths of the total 2016-to-2019 increase in the net number of females firms add per year and
more than a third of the overall increase”).
327. See CALPERS, CALPERS’ GOVERNANCE & SUSTAINABILITY PRINCIPLES (2019),
https://www.calpers.ca.gov/docs/forms-publications/governance-and-sustainability-principles.pdf
[ https://perma.cc/JLW3-J87S ].
328. See Corporate Engagement, CALPERS, https://www.calpers.ca.gov/page/investments/
corporate-governance/corporate-engagements [ https://perma.cc/3YPS-489S] ( last visited Jan. 8, 2021 ).
329. See Diverse Director DataSource (3D), EQUILAR, http://marketing.equilar.com/24-equilardiversity-network [ https://perma.cc/K4YJ-ZE42 ] ( last visited Nov. 15, 2021).
330. Reed, supra note 19.
331. For some companies, a male-dominated culture is established much before the company
becomes a publicly traded company. See Fan, supra note 98, at 348–49.
332. See Fairfax, All on Board?, supra note 10, at 1055–56.
333. See, e.g., Alphabet, Inc. – Senior Executive Diversity (2019), TRILLIUM ASSET MGMT.,
https://trilliuminvest.com/shareholder-proposal/alphabet-inc-senior-executive-diversity-2019/ [ https://
web.archive.org/web/20190203075946/https://trilliuminvest.com/shareholder-proposal/alphabetinc-senior-executive-diversity-2019/ ] ( last visited Feb. 3, 2019 ); Carter’s, Inc. – Executive Leadership
Diversity (2019), TRILLIUM ASSET MGMT., https://trilliuminvest.com/shareholder-proposal/cartersinc-executive-leadership-diversity-2019/
[ https://web.archive.org/web/20190204185222/http://
www.trilliuminvest.com/shareholder-proposal/carters-inc-executive-leadership-diversity-2019/ ] ( last
visited Feb. 4, 2019 ); Newell Brands – Executive Leadership Diversity (2019), TRILLIUM
ASSET MGMT., https://trilliuminvest.com/shareholder-proposal/newell-brands-executive-leadership-
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advocacy groups have begun to raise the issue of diversity at the executive level and
among a company’s workforce, as a top engagement and stewardship priority.334
Institutional investors have begun to focus on diversity disclosure in senior
leadership, with a renewed focus on racial justice in 2020 serving as an important
impetus for investors to focus on diversity beyond the board. For example, in 2020,
BlackRock asked companies to include in their sustainability report the company’s
long-term plans to improve diversity, equity, and inclusion, including addressing
diversity beyond the board of directors to employees and other leaders.335 Similarly,
in 2020, the New York City Comptroller, on behalf of the New York City
Employees’ Retirement System, Teachers’ Retirement System of the City of New
York, and New York City Board of Education Retirement System, asked Fortune
100 companies to disclose publicly their EEO-1 reports, which are filed with the
Equal Employment Opportunity Commission.336 Arguing that “[p]ublicly
disclosing the demographics of employees by race, gender, and ethnicity—including
and most notably those in leadership and senior management positions—will
provide critical information for shareowners to better understand workforce
practices, identify areas for improvement, and benchmark diversity performance,”
the request is a major step towards shareholder pressure on diversity
beyond the board.337
Some of America’s largest companies recently have experienced pressure
through shareholder proposals to diversify the C-Suite.338 Shareholder diversity
proposals have taken several forms. Some proposals focus on disclosure and
transparency, such as requesting a report on workforce diversity or on the
company’s strategic plan to increase diversity on its board and workforce.339 Others

diversity-2019/ [ https://web.archive.org/web/20190326173819/https://trilliuminvest.com/
shareholder-proposal/newell-brands-executive-leadership-diversity-2019/ ] ( last visited Mar. 26, 2019 ).
334. See Matteo Tonello, 2021 Proxy Season Preview and Shareholder Voting Trends
(2017-2020), HARV. L. SCH. F. ON CORP. GOVERNANCE (Feb. 11, 2021), https://
corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2021/02/11/2021-proxy-season-preview-and-shareholder-voting-trends2017-2020/ [ https://perma.cc/Z75Z-7VXJ ].
335. See BLACKROCK, OUR APPROACH TO ENGAGEMENT ON HUMAN CAPITAL
MANAGEMENT (2021), https://www.blackrock.com/corporate/literature/publication/blk-commentary
-engagement-on-human-capital.pdf [ https://perma.cc/VZX9-ZWEK ]; Martinez & Fletcher, supra
note 4, at 893.
336. Press Release, N.Y.C. Comptroller Brad Lander, Comptroller Stringer, NYC Funds
Escalate Campaign Calling on Major Companies to Publicly Disclose Workforce Demographics
(Dec. 10, 2020), https://comptroller.nyc.gov/newsroom/comptroller-stringer-nyc-funds-escalatecampaign-calling-on-major-companies-to-publicly-disclose-workforce-demographics/ [ https://
perma.cc/2JU9-F67A] [ hereinafter NYC Comptroller].
337. Id.
338. Id.
339. See Angelo Martinez, Shedding Light on Diversity-Based Shareholder Proposals,
HARV. L. SCH. F. ON CORP. GOVERNANCE (Oct. 16, 2018), https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2018/
10/16/shedding-light-on-diversity-based-shareholder-proposals/
[ https://perma.cc/J5VQ-33A8 ]
(“Shareholder proposals dealing with gender and diversity are defined as proposals that request
companies to disclose measures taken to create greater diversity on the board or in the workplace,
prepare a report with a comprehensive breakdown of its workforce by race and gender, or provide
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seek action from the company. One example is proposals to include diversity targets
into senior executives’ compensation packages.340
A set of 2018 proposals at Alphabet (Google’s parent company) is illustrative
of the pressure companies are facing. Diversity proposals at Alphabet were backed
by a group of shareholder-employees in coordination with Zevin Asset
Management, a boutique, socially responsible investment manager.341 These
proposals sought to tie executive pay to obtaining diversity goals, for the company
to complete a report on its gender pay-gap, and to report on the diversity of the
board. All three proposals were opposed by management, and all three failed to
receive a majority vote.342
Other leading companies have also received shareholder proposals focused on
diversity at the executive level. For example, in 2017, a non-employee shareholder
of Apple, again with the backing of Zevin Asset Management, made a diversity
proposal to Apple.343 This proposal sought a recruitment strategy to increase
diversity at the executive level and on the board.344 Like many other proposals on
diversity beyond the board, Apple’s management opposed the proposal stating that
they were already engaged in diversity recruitment strategies beyond the scope of
this proposal, and it was not needed.345 Yet by 2021, almost all of the company’s
senior vice presidents in charge of important business units continue to be men.346
3. Advisors and Client Pressure to Diversify
The gender and racial disparities at law firms are long-standing and have been
well-known for decades. Thus far, many of the initiatives to address such disparities
have fallen short of their goals.

information regarding the policies and goals of the company to reduce and address the gender pay
gap.”); see also NYC Comptroller, supra note 336.
340. See, e.g., Alphabet, Inc., supra note 333.
341. See Vibhuti Sharma & Paresh Dave, Alphabet Shareholders Reject Diversity Proposal Backed
by Employees, REUTERS ( June 6, 2018, 10:14 AM), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-alphabet-incagm/alphabet-shareholders-reject-diversity-proposal-backed-by-employees-idUSKCN1J22BS [ https://
perma.cc/MBX6-PAUG ]. Zevin Asset Management is a “boutique investment manager” that
specializes in socially responsible investing and sustainability. ZEVIN ASSET MGMT.,
https://www.zevin.com/ [ https://perma.cc/FUN6-4TDP ] ( last visited Oct. 24, 2021 ).
342. See Luke Stangel, Alphabet Kills Shareholder Proposal Tying Diversity Goals to Executive
Pay, SILICON VALLEY BUS. J. ( June 7, 2018, 8:39 AM), https://www.bizjournals.com/sanjose/news/
2018/06/07/goog-shareholder-proposal-diversity-executive-pay.html [ https://perma.cc/JVJ6-SA2Z ];
see also Alphabet, Inc., Current Report (Form 8-K) ( June 6, 2018).
343. See Queena Sook Kim, Apple Shareholder Proposal Seeks More Diverse Company Leadership,
KQED NEWS (Feb. 24, 2017), https://www.kqed.org/news/11330108/apple-shareholder-proposalseeks-more-diverse-company-leadership [ https://perma.cc/W4V3-AFET ].
344. Id.
345. See Apple Inc., Definitive Proxy Statement (Schedule 14A) (Dec. 30, 2016),
https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/320193/000119312517003753/d257185ddef14a.htm
[ https://perma.cc/4HJ4-JH6Z ].
346. See Apple Leadership, APPLE INC., https://www.apple.com/leadership/ [ https://
perma.cc/5BL7-SA4U ] (last visited Jan. 8, 2022 ).
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Over the past few years, law firms have begun to face increasing client
pressure to add diversity to their legal teams.347 For example, in response to a 2019
Paul Weiss partnership announcement that was dominated by white men, more than
170 general counsels and chief legal officers came together to express their desire
to see partnership announcements that “reflect the diversity of the legal
profession.”348 A variety of large corporations have advocated for diversity among
outside counsel, in part due to rising diversity among in-house counsel teams.349 In
2017, for example, Kim Rivera, HP’s chief legal officer and general counsel,
announced a diversity mandate to outside law firms stating that women represented
fifty-five percent of HP’s legal team and that the company would withhold invoice
fees from firms that did not meet diversity requirements.350 HP’s mandate required
firms to “field (i) at least one diverse firm relationship partner, regularly engaged
with HP on billing and staffing issues; or (ii) at least one woman and one
racially/ethnically diverse attorney, each performing or managing at least 10% of
the billable hours worked on HP matters.”351 For clients that seek to effectively
advocate for diversity, their insistence on diverse deal teams may need to be more
nuanced and backed by their spending, so that diversity goals are not achieved solely
through representation of the most junior members of a deal team but also among
the senior leaders and managers of teams.
With respect to client pressure, disclosure and transparency are critical to help
clients better advocate for diversity among outside counsel. A few clients appear
poised to place more heavy emphasis on diversity disclosure and leadership at law
firms. For example, in January 2021, Coca-Cola’s then-general counsel issued new
guidelines stating that that not only must firms provide Coca-Cola with quarterly
analysis of the diversity of teams working on the company’s matters, but they must
commit that for each new matter, thirty percent of each billed associate and partner
time will be from diverse attorneys, with half such amounts from Black attorneys.352
“The firms also have to be transparent about how origination credit is awarded and

347. For a list of examples, see Clients Push for Diversity, DIVERSITY LAB, https://
www.diversitylab.com/knowledge-sharing/clients-push-for-diversity/
[ https://perma.cc/X9US
-P77D ] ( last updated July 8, 2017 ).
348. See Noam Scheiber & John Eligon, Elite Law Firm’s All-White Partner Class Stirs Debate
on Diversity, N.Y. TIMES ( Jan. 27, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/01/27/us/paul-weisspartner-diversity-law-firm.html [ https://perma.cc/4MPD-DSVQ ].
349. Phillip Bantz, More Minority, Women General Counsel at Top US Companies Than Ever
Before, LAW.COM: CORP. COUNS. (Aug. 31, 2020, 3:06 PM), https://www.law.com/corpcounsel/
2020/08/31/more-minority-women-general-counsel-at-top-us-companies-than-ever-before/?slreturn
=20210925014936 [ https://perma.cc/979N-N7FV].
350. See Letter from Kim Rivera, Chief Legal Officer and Gen. Counsel, HP Inc., on Diversity
Mandate to Partner Law Firms (Feb. 8, 2017) (on file with author).
351. Id.
352. See Bradley M. Gayton, Commitment to Diversity, Belonging, and Outside Counsel Diversity,
COCA-COLA CO. ( Jan. 27, 2021), https://www.coca-colacompany.com/media-center/bradley-gaytonon-commitment-to-diversity [ https://perma.cc/U7RD-BWNK].
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identify at least two diverse attorneys as a potential successor to a partner on
Coca-Cola’s book of business.”353
Whether client-led efforts such as Coca-Cola’s will result in significant
diversity shifts among partners at law firms remains to be seen.354 Shortly after the
announcement of the initiative, Coca-Cola’s then-general counsel was ousted, with
concerns that his dismissal may dissuade other similar diversity goals.355 Moreover,
Coca-Cola’s own initiative was placed on hold as it became the subject of
significant controversy, including potential legal challenge under federal
antidiscrimination laws.356
With respect to M&A financial advisors, however, there is little evidence of
clients insisting on the diversity of deal teams or advisors.
D. Quotas and Mandates
In many countries, board diversity was first ushered in through legislative
efforts. Professor Darren Rosenblum has described the variety of quotas and
mandates to advance board diversity, beginning with Norway being the first country
to enact a gender quota law.357 While quotas were commonly viewed as
unachievable in the United States, in 2018, California became the first U.S. state to
mandate gender diversity on boards. Senate Bill 826 requires publicly traded
companies headquartered in California to have at least one female director by the
end of 2019 and at least two (three) female directors on five (six or more) member
boards by the end of 2021.358 Studies suggest that the California legislation has had
a considerable impact on the number of women on boards.359 For example, a 2020
study by Greene, Intintoli, and Kahle found that as a result of the California
353. Phillip Bantz, Coca-Cola General Counsel Says Diversity Efforts Aren’t Working, Unveils
New Guidelines, LAW.COM: CORP. COUNS. ( Jan. 28, 2021, at 11:15 AM), https://www.law.com/
corpcounsel/2021/01/28/coca-cola-general-counsel-says-diversity-efforts-arent-working-unveils-new
-guidelines/ [ https://perma.cc/EF6C-MCPS ].
354. See Meredith Hobbs, Will Coke’s New Guidelines Move the Needle for Law Firms?,
LAW.COM: DAILY REP. (Feb. 1, 2021, 5:52 PM), https://www.law.com/dailyreportonline/2021/02/
01/will-cokes-new-guidelines-move-the-needle-for-law-firms/ [ https://perma.cc/TLW2-EE88 ].
355. See Varsha Patel, The Coca-Cola Effect: Is This The Beginning of the End for GC-Led
Diversity Initiatives?, LAW.COM INT’L (May 10, 2021, 7:36 AM), https://www.law.com/internationaledition/2021/05/10/the-coca-cola-effect-is-this-the-beginning-of-the-end-for-gc-led-diversity-initiatives/
[ https://perma.cc/3ETD-A4CG ].
356. See Chris Opfer, Erin Mulvaney & Ruiqi Chen, Coca-Cola Diversity Policy in Review May
Get Legal Challenge (3), BLOOMBERG L. (Apr. 30, 2021, 1:20 PM), https://news.bloomberglaw.com/
business-and-practice/coca-cola-diversity-policy-under-review-may-get-legal-challenge [ https://
perma.cc/VRR8-B98A].
357. See generally Darren Rosenblum, Diversity and the Board of Directors: A Comparative
Perspective, in RESEARCH HANDBOOK ON COMPARATIVE CORPORATE GOVERNANCE 179, 179 (Afra
Afsharipour & Martin Gelter eds., 2021).
358. Id. For an analysis of the new California quota, see generally Rosenblum, California
Dreaming?, supra note 10, at 1435.
359. See Cydney Posner, California Mandates Board Diversity for “Underrepresented
Communities”, COOLEY PUBCO (Oct. 1, 2018), https://cooleypubco.com/2020/10/01/californiamandates-board-diversity-underrepresented-communities/ [ https://perma.cc/5UHZ-J4RW ].
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legislation, the number of board seats held by female directors increased by
twenty-three percent (143 board seats).360 Nevertheless, seventy of the 488 firms
subject to the legislation continued to have all male boards as of their 2019 proxy
filing.361 Other states have also enacted legislation to increase diversity on boards.362
In addition to state legislation, stock exchanges have also announced a move
toward diversity requirements for listed companies. For example, in 2020, Nasdaq
submitted a rule to the Securities and Exchange Commission to require that
companies listed on Nasdaq appoint at least one woman and at least one minority
or LGBTQ+ person to their boards or explain why they have failed to do so.363 The
SEC approved the Nasdaq listing rule in August 2021.364
To date, no country has mandated diversity in the C-Suite or among executives
more generally. Germany, which mandated a thirty percent gender diversity quota
for the supervisory board of companies, is the first country to hint at diversity
beyond the board of directors.365 In early 2021, Germany approved a draft law that
would mandate the inclusion of at least one woman on the management board of
listed companies.366 In the United States, one would expect considerable political
opposition to any such efforts, as well as a variety of legal hurdles.367 For example,
in the United States, even board diversity advocates have largely eschewed quotas
in favor of disclosure.368

360. See Daniel Greene, Vincent J. Intintoli & Kathleen M. Kahle, Do Board Gender Quotas
Affect Firm Value? Evidence from California Senate Bill No. 826, 60 J. CORP. FIN. (2020). The study
also found that of the 136 firms that add a female director, forty percent replace male directors while
sixty percent expand the board. Id. Firms expand (replace) when pre-SB 826 board size is smaller
(greater), suggesting that increasing the board above a certain size is costly. See id.
361. Id.
362. See supra notes 91–97 and accompanying text; see also Hatcher & Latham, supra note 91.
363. See Ron S. Berenblat & Elizabeth Gonzalez-Sussman, Nasdaq Proposes New Listing Rules
Related to Board Diversity, HARV. L. SCH. F. ON CORP. GOVERNANCE (Dec. 13, 2020),
https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2020/12/13/nasdaq-proposes-new-listing-rules-related-to-boarddiversity/ [https://perma.cc/MGZ7-R586 ].
364. See Cydney Posner, SEC Approves Nasdaq “Comply-or-Explain” Proposal for Board
Diversity, COOLEY PUBCO (Aug. 9, 2021), https://cooleypubco.com/2021/08/09/sec-approvesnasdaq-diversity-proposal/ [ https://perma.cc/JJ82-UJZN ].
365. See Geneva Abdul, German Parliament Backs ‘Milestone’ Gender Quota for Company Boards,
N.Y. TIMES ( June 11, 2021) https://www.nytimes.com/2021/06/11/world/germany-gender-quotaboards.html [ https://perma.cc/CCN8-MKHC ].
366. See Martina Ortner & Judy Witten, Women’s Quota on the Executive Board in Germany, JD
SUPRA (Feb. 16, 2021) https://www.jdsupra.com/legalnews/women-s-quota-on-the-executive-boardin-6733092/ [ https://perma.cc/RA26-K2UE]. In 2021, women accounted for only 11.5 percent of
positions on management boards of the largest 100 listed companies in Germany. Maria Sheahan,
German Cabinet Agrees Quota for Women on Company Boards, REUTERS ( Jan. 6, 2021, 2:28 AM),
https://www.reuters.com/article/us-germany-women-companies/german-cabinet-agrees-quota-forwomen-on-company-boards-idUSKBN29B16U [ https://perma.cc/98KX-Q2HZ ].
367. For example, efforts toward board diversity quotas in the United States have faced
considerable opposition, resulting in a largely disclosure-based model. See DHIR, supra note 10,
at 78–82; see generally Véronique Magnier & Darren Rosenblum, Quotas and the Transatlantic Divergence
of Corporate Governance, 34 NW. J. INT’L L. & BUS. 249, 266 (2014).
368. See Rhode & Packel, supra note 10, at 422–23.
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E. Improving the Pipeline in Professional Schools
Women leaders in M&A have pointed to the pipeline of women into M&A
practice as one of the root causes of leadership disparity. In studying gender
disparities in M&A legal advisors, a study conducted by the ABA’s Women in M&A
Task Force focused on law schools as the potential root of the problem.369 The
study looked at several top schools which tend to produce a significant portion of
M&A attorneys and noted that while women make up, on average, forty-six percent
of the student body population, they make up only thirty-seven percent of students
in M&A related classes.370
Why do women students under enroll in M&A-related classes? The makeup
of faculty teaching such classes may provide some clues.371 Hand-collected data on
file with the author indicates that in general women rarely makeup a majority of the
corporate law faculty at the top fifty law schools, especially at the schools ranked in
the top ten. For example, Harvard Law School and Columbia Law School are
frequently identified as the leading feeders to elite law firms.372 In 2021, at Harvard
Law School, one woman is listed out of eleven faculty members who are identified
as being within the corporate law curriculum, while at Columbia Law School,
women make up four of the twenty-one faculty members identified as having
expertise in the corporate law curriculum.373
In hand-collected data, this Article found that for M&A courses taught at the
top fifty law schools over the year 2018–2019 and 2019–2020, only fifteen
instructors out of 101 were women.374 This includes seven (out of thirty-eight)
full-time female faculty members (including the author), seven women adjunct
faculty (out of sixty adjunct faculty), and three visiting faculty.375 Students often
369. See Frankle et al., supra note 25.
370. Id. The authors considered enrollment figures at Berkeley, Chicago, Columbia, Duke,
Harvard, Michigan, Northwestern, NYU, Penn, Stanford, Virginia, and Yale. See id.
371. Studies have found gender divisions in subject areas taught at law schools, with women
underrepresented in certain fields. See generally Marjorie E. Kornhauser, Rooms of Their Own: An
Empirical Study of Occupational Segregation by Gender Among Law Professors, 73 UMKC L. REV. 293
(2004); Ann C. McGinley, Reproducing Gender on Law School Faculties, 2009 BYU L. REV. 99. Studies
have also found shortcomings in legal education’s inclusion of women students. See generally Sari Bashi
& Maryana Iskander, Why Legal Education is Failing Women, 18 YALE J. L. & FEM. 389 (2006).
372. See Ilana Kowarski, 10 Law Schools that Lead to Jobs at Big Firms, U.S. NEWS & WORLD
REP. (May 26, 2021, 9:00 AM), https://www.usnews.com/education/best-graduate-schools/top-lawschools/slideshows/10-law-schools-that-lead-to-full-time-jobs-at-big-law-firms?slide=13
[ https://web.archive.org/web/20210527194448/https://www.usnews.com/education/best-graduateschools/top-law-schools/slideshows/10-law-schools-that-lead-to-full-time-jobs-at-big-law-firms].
373. See Faculty Profiles, Corporate Law, HARV. L. SCH., https://hls.harvard.edu/faculty/
directory/?g=&i=CORPORATELAW&d=Corporate%20Law
[ https://perma.cc/5ENL-WG3T]
( last visited Aug. 1, 2021 ); Faculty Directory, Corporate, Business, and Transactional Law,
COLUM. L. SCH., https://www.law.columbia.edu/faculty-and-scholarship/all-faculty?type=23&aos=273
[ https://perma.cc/3MRN-8YZ7 ] (last visited Aug. 1, 2021 ).
374. Data collected by author from faculty pages of top 50 law schools (data on file with author).
Schools were selected based on the 2019 US News & World Report law school rankings.
375. Data collected by author from faculty pages of top 10 law schools (data on file
with author).

Clean Final Edit_Afsharipour_v2 (ET editrs).docx (Do Not Delete)

418

UC IRVINE LAW REVIEW

1/31/2022 10:48 AM

[ V ol. 12:359

report that role models are important in pursuing practice areas. But, without
sufficient role models teaching M&A classes, there is little surprise that few women
or students of color enter the profession or envision themselves as
leaders in M&A.376
CONCLUSION
Corporations, law firms, and investment banks all state that diversity matters.
Women leaders in M&A, and a growing number of male leaders, increasingly are
recognizing the case for gender equity in leadership. Yet, the data in this Article
shows that when it comes to some of the most important business decisions made
by companies and their advisors, there is a glaring chasm between stated
commitment and action. Uncovering this gap is important for two reasons. First,
from an equity standpoint, a significant portion of the population is excluded from
key decision-making roles in fundamental deals that greatly impact companies,
their stakeholders, and financial markets more broadly. Second, research on group
decision-making suggests that greater diversity could improve M&A
transactions—often
plagued
by
decision-making
shortcomings—in
meaningful ways.
To date, scholarly discourse on M&A has largely overlooked gender equity.
Moreover, the discourse on gender equality in corporate law and corporate
governance has remained primarily focused on the board of directors. The focus on
gender equality on boards of directors has begun to make an impact on board
composition. But disclosure and transparency about the gender gap among leaders
at other important institutional actors involved in M&A deals—executives, legal
advisors, and financial advisors—remain low. This Article argues that
understanding, documenting, and disclosing the gender disparity in leadership in
M&A beyond the board is critical for increasing accountability and for determining
the solutions that may work to reduce such disparities.

376. Professor Meera Deo has done important work that addresses the gender and racial
disparities that continue to exist in law schools and how such disparities impact legal education and the
training of students. See DEO, supra note 32.
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APPENDIX A—METHODOLOGY
The data presented in this Article represents an original dataset that was
hand-collected by the author and a team of researchers. To identify the top 100
announced public M&A deals, focusing on targets that were U.S.-reporting
companies, we first searched the Bloomberg Law Deal Analytics Mergers and
Acquisitions database. Bloomberg Law uses a proprietary method to populate their
M&A database, using EDGAR filings and press releases as common sources. We
searched the Bloomberg Law database first because it presented the most
high-value announced transactions even if the parties to the transaction never filed
with the Securities and Exchange Commission. We then checked the information
obtained from Bloomberg Law against West Law’s PracticalLaw What’s Market
Public Merger Agreements database to ensure that we captured the highest value
transactions from each year in the event that Bloomberg Law failed to include any
deals in their report. To compile their database, PracticalLaw pulls information and
documents from public filings through the SEC, EDGAR filings and disclosures,
SEDAR (Canada), Australian Stock Exchange, Annual Reports to Shareholders,
EDGAR Precedent Agreements, and any other publicly filed papers or information.
In some cases, the announced transactions were terminated, withdrawn, or
still pending. For these deals, it was very difficult to find any information other than
the parties involved, the announced date, and the announced dollar value. If neither
Bloomberg Law nor West Law had information about the lead counsel for the
parties for these deals, we first searched through the SEC’s EDGAR database for
documents filed two weeks from the announced date. Next, we searched
LexisNexis’ Law360, which tended to contain more information about the parties
than other sources for deals that were pending or proposed. If we could not find
the information there, we then searched the internet to look for press releases from
either the parties involved or the law firms representing them. If none of these
searches yielded the names of lead counsel on both sides of the transaction, we did
not include the transaction in the study.
Lead attorneys were identified by evaluating the publicly filed acquisition
agreements. Bloomberg’s dataset include the “Deal Data” link to the acquisition
agreement on file in the “Documents” tab. For each transaction, we also evaluated
whether the parties had filed an 8-K “current report” filing with the SEC with the
acquisition agreement as an exhibits contract labeled under the term “merger” or
“2.1”.377 A current report on Form 8-K must be filed by companies subject to the
periodic reporting requirements of the Securities and Exchange Act of 1934 within
four business days from the date when the company enters into a definitive material
agreement, including a merger agreement.378 In general, the reporting firm includes

377. Form 8–Ks are not the exclusive means that agreements are filed in acquisitions and can
be filed on other SEC forms such as tender offer documents.
378. For the current rules under Form 8-K, see SEC, FORM 8-K, http://www.sec.gov/about/
forms/form8-k.pdf [ https://perma.cc/2EDL-5FVA]; SEC, FINAL RULE: ADDITIONAL FORM 8–K
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the actual agreement as an exhibit to the Form 8-K.379 The agreements are therefore
available online via the EDGAR system of the SEC. We also collected data from
press releases issued in connection with the transactions. After identifying the
transactions, we hand collected data on the following: the date the deal was
announced, the value of the transaction when it was announced, the names of the
buyer and target companies, the buyer’s country of origin, whether the target and
buyer were responsible for reporting to the SEC, the names and law firms for lead
counsel representing each party, the gender of lead counsel, and a link to each
counsel’s professional bio.

DISCLOSURE REQUIREMENTS AND ACCELERATION OF FILING (2004) [ hereinafter SEC, FINAL
RULE ] (noting that “[ i ]tem 1.01 [ Entry into a Definitive Material Agreement ] requires disclosure of all
material definitive agreements specified by the item, including business combination agreements and
other agreements that relate to extraordinary corporate transactions”).
379. See SEC, FINAL RULE, supra note 378 (“[ W ]e encourage companies to file the exhibit with
the Form 8–K when feasible, particularly when no confidential treatment is requested.”). The company
is required to file the agreement as an exhibit to its next periodic filing if it does not file the agreement
as an exhibit to an 8–K. Id.
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APPENDIX B—ADDITIONAL DATA CHARTS
Lead Counsel in 2014 by Deal Size
Deals by Size
(quartiles)
1 - 25
26 - 50
51 - 75
76- 100
Total

Women on Buyer Side
6
2
4
6
18

Total Lead CounselBuyer
Percentage Women on Target Side Total Lead Counsel- Target Percentage
53
11.3%
4
60
6.7%
59
3.4%
5
54
9.3%
47
8.5%
7
46
15.2%
48
12.5%
5
49
10.2%
207
8.7%
21
209
10.0%

Lead Counsel in 2015 by Deal Size
Deals by Size
Total Lead Counsel(quartiles) Women on Buyer Side
Buyer
Percentage
1 - 25
6
63
9.5%
26 - 50
5
47
10.6%
51 - 75
4
49
8.2%
76- 100
6
50
12.0%
Total
21
209
10.0%

Women on Target Side
11
2
5
4
22

Total Lead CounselTarget
61
47
51
45
204

Percentage
18.0%
4.3%
9.8%
8.9%
10.8%

Total Lead CounselTarget
70
46
46
52
214

Percentage
8.6%
10.9%
10.9%
9.6%
9.8%

Lead Counsel in 2016 by Deal Size
Deals by Size
Total Lead Counsel(quartiles) Women on Buyer Side
Buyer
Percentage Women on Target Side
1 - 25
4
57
7.0%
6
26 - 50
6
61
9.8%
5
51 - 75
5
53
9.4%
5
76- 100
6
54
11.1%
5
Total
21
225
9.3%
21
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Lead Counsel in 2017 by Deal Size
Deals by Size
(quartiles) Women on Buyer Side Total Lead Counsel- Buyer Percentage Women on Target Side Total Lead Counsel- Target Percentage
1 - 25
4
54
7.4%
3
60
5.0%
26 - 50
6
54
11.1%
5
59
8.5%
51 - 75
10
51
19.6%
3
49
6.1%
76- 100
7
49
14.3%
8
55
14.5%
Total
27
208
13.0%
19
223
8.5%

Lead Counsel in 2018 by Deal Size
Deals by Size
(quartiles)
1 - 25
26 - 50
51 - 75
76- 100
Total

Women on Buyer Side
5
4
10
3
22

Total Lead CounselBuyer
62
54
57
56
229

Percentage Women on Target Side
8.1%
4
7.4%
8
17.5%
7
5.4%
10
9.6%
29

Total Lead CounselTarget
65
63
54
54
236

Percentage
6.2%
12.7%
13.0%
18.5%
12.3%

Lead Counsel in 2019 by Deal Size
Deals by Size
(quartile)
1 - 25
26 - 50
51 - 75
76- 100
Total

Women on Buyer Side
3
6
6
11
26

Total Lead CounselTotal Lead CounselBuyer
Percentage Women on Target Side
Target
Percentage
62
4.8%
11
67
16.4%
70
8.6%
10
61
16.4%
54
11.1%
11
59
18.6%
56
19.6%
10
55
18.2%
242
10.7%
42
242
17.4%

Lead Counsel in 2020 by Deal Size
Deals by Size
(quartile) Women on Buyer Side
1 - 25
7
26 - 50
8
51 - 75
7
76- 100
3
Total
25

Total Lead CounselBuyer
60
53
47
52
212

Percentage Women on Target Side
11.7%
12
15.1%
12
14.9%
9
5.8%
13
11.8%
46

Total Lead CounselTarget
58
63
53
64
238

Percentage
20.7%
19.0%
17.0%
20.3%
19.3%

